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PATENTS ON A SHOESTRING: MAKING PATENT 
PROTECTION WORK FOR DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
Sean A. Pager-
INTRODUCTION 
"The main challenge for developing countries is to transform 
[TRIPS] from a rent transfer mechanism into an effective 
instrument for technological development." 
- Carlos Primo Braga I 
Depending on your point of view, the 1994 TRIPS Agreement2 
was either a dramatic leap forward or an unprecedented act of legal 
imperialism.3 By putting in place mandatory minimum standards 
covering all the major intellectual property (IP) rights (plus some 
minor ones), backed by mandatory dispute resolution enforceable 
• Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Richmond School of Law; Assistant Professor, 
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Yu, Kevin Collins, Shubha Ghosh, Doris Long, and the participants of the 2007 Georgia State Law 
Review Symposium, the 2007 IP Scholars Conference at DePaul University, and the 2007 Works-in-
Progress in Intellectual Property Colloquium at American University. Research assistance was provided 
by Maryarn Nemazie and Vinicius Portugal. This paper is dedicated to my daughters, Sophie and Sasha, 
and to my wife, Sheryl. 
I. Carlos A. Primo Braga, Trade-Related Intellectual Property Issues: The Uruguay Round 
Agreement and Its Economic Implications. in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 
(World Bank Discussion Paper No. 307, William Martin & L. Alan Winters eds., 1995), quoted in 
Robert Sherwood, The TRIPS Agreement: Implications for Developing Countries, 37 IDEA 491, 493 
(1997). 
2. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. IS, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 l.L.M. 1197 
(1994), available at http://www.wto.orglenglishltratop_effRIPS_elt_agmO_e.htm [hereinafter TRIPS 
Agreement]. 
3. Some would say it was both. Compare EDMOND MCGoNUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
REGULATION §§ 21.211,21.21-1 (1995) (''The conclusion of the ... TRIPS Agreement was perhaps the 
most remarkable achievement of the Uruguay Round."), with Francis Mangeni, Implementing the TRIPS 
Agreement in Africa, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE 
AND SUSTAINABILITY 219, 230 (Christophe Bellman et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter TRADING IN 
KNOWLEDGE] (describing TRIPS as "in essence written by developed country industry lobbies" to profit 
at the expense of the developing world). Nor do these assessments exhaust the range of views on TRIPS' 
significance. See. e.g., KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
2 (2000) (emphasizing TRIPS' unique status within the WTO regime of international trade law). 
755 
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through trade sanctions, TRIPS has come close to achieving the long-
sought goal of universal worldwide IP protection.4 
Patents remain by far the most controversial of the IP rights 
harmonized under TRIPS. Not only do patents confer significantly 
stronger rights of exclusivity than other IP regimes,S the subject 
matter of patents-technology-most directly impinges on economic 
prosperity. 6 In the case of pharmaceuticals, access to patented 
technology can literally become an issue of life or death. Indeed, the 
recent showdown in the World Trade Organization (WTO) over 
compulsory licensing of AIDS medication served as a wake-up call 
for many who had previously dismissed patents as a technical domain 
of interest only to specialists.7 Patent protection suddenly became the 
ugly face of globalization,8 seemingly a hazard to public health9 and 
travesty of social justice. 10 
4. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay 
Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 275 (1997). Adherence to 
TRIPS is compulsory for all WTO members. 
5. For example, unlike copyrights and trade secrets, patents give exclusive rights to inventors even 
as against those who independently discover the patented invention. Unlike trademarks, patents govern 
any use of the invention, rather than uses within specific contexts. 
6. Access to technology is intimately linked to the wealth of nations. See infra notes 29-31 and 
accompanying text. By contrast, no one is going to starve because they cannot watch the latest 
Hollywood blockbuster (copyright) or purchase a fake Gucci handbag (trademark). 
7. The AIDS pharmaceutical crisis galvanized global attention and threatened to disrupt the Doha 
Round of WTO trade negotiations. See Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: World 
Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection of Public Health, 99 AM. J. lNT'L L. 317 (2005) (describing 
WTO controversy); Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and the New Dynamics 
of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1,27,42-43 (2004) (describing 
lack of attention to intellectual property issues displayed by global human rights, agriculture, 
environmental, public health, and development agencies and NGOs prior to TRIPS and linking the 
World Health Organization's entry into the global patent debate specifically to the AIDS pharmaceutical 
debacle). 
8. See. e.g., MAsKUS, supra note 3, at 14 (describing IP protection as at the forefront of 
controversies over globalization and "a focus of contention about the future of the WTO"). 
9. See. e.g., K. Balasubramaniam, Access to Medicines and Public Policy Safeguards Under TRIPS, 
in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE, supra note 3, at 135. Such concerns go beyond the pharmaceutical 
context. See. e.g., Michael Crichton, Patenting Life, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13,2007, at A2 (decrying gene 
patents as threat to public health). 
10. See. e.g., Francis Mangeni, supra note 3, at 219, 230 (describing TRIPS' potential to 
U[i]mpoverish[ ] and leav[e] destitute entire populations in developing countries"); Rochelle Cooper 
Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 21,28-30 (2004) (describing 
TRIPS as an unconscionable bargain). 
HeinOnline -- 23 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 757 2006-2007
2007) PATENTS ON A SHOESTRING 757 
Discontent over TRIPS' patent provisions goes well beyond 
pharmaceuticals. Patent systems are, by nature, the most 
administratively demanding form of IP protection, requmng 
extensive record-keeping and sophisticated technical analysis. II Yet, 
given that the top ten industrialized countries account for 94% of 
patents granted worldwide, the benefits of patent protection are 
heavily skewed. 12 Even TRIPS' defenders concede that its patent 
mandate represents an onerous and costly obligation whose 
immediate benefits will redound primarily to rich multinational 
companies. \3 Furthermore, because technology is a cumulative 
enterprise,14 TRIPS opponents worry that enforcing patent 
monopolies will deny developing countries access to vital 
technology, relegating them to a future of economic dependency. 15 
The debate over whether or not patent protection makes sense in 
developing countries began long before TRIPS and continues today.16 
However, what has changed is that TRIPS is now a reality.17 Except 
for the least developed countries (LDCs) who can defer full 
II. ROBERT SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1990); see also 
Keith Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development, 32 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 
471, 494 (2000) (providing estimates of TRIPS-compliance costs in selected developing countries 
averaging an extra $1 million annuaJly). 
12. See Carlos M. Correa,lnternationalization of the Patent System and New Technologies, 20 WIS. 
!NT'L L.J. 523,523 (2002). 
\3. Maskus, supra note II, at 489-494; Daniel J. Gervais, Intellectual Property. Trade & 
Development: The State of Play, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 50S, 530-31 (2005). But see Edmund W. Kitch, 
The Patent Policy of Developing Countries, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 166, 177 (1994) (arguing that 
patent fees can defray administrative costs and suggesting royalty rates will be discounted to reflect the 
reduced ability of developing countries to pay). 
14. See Correa, supra note 12, at 525-28. 
IS. A. Samuel Oddi, The International Patent System and Third Word Development: Reality or 
Myth?, 1987 DUKE LJ. 831, 863 (\987) (describing "desperate" situation of "almost irreversible" 
technological inferiority); Dreyfuss, supra note 10, at 21, 28-30 (2004) (describing TRIPS as an 
unconscionable bargain). 
16. See. e.g., EDITH PENROSE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM ch. XI 
(1951) (arguing that developing countries should be exempt from international patent laws). 
17. The very existence of TRIPS may have altered some of the baseline conditions of this debate. 
For example, patent advocates often cite studies that show a correlation between stronger patent 
protection and foreign direct investment (FDI). However, in a post-TRIPS world where all WTO 
members are obligated to provide a fairly high level of patent protection, the incremental benefit to any 
one country from doing so may be neutralized. On the other hand, the costs of patent protection might 
also be reduced; to the extent that TRIPS' implementation has eliminated alternative suppliers of 
"pirate" products, the incremental costs of importing patented goods may disappear. 
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compliance until 2013,18 all WTO members are obligated to provide 
a fairly broad baseline level of patent protection. For more than 90% 
of the world's population,19 the question is therefore no longer 
whether to have a patent system, but what kind of patent system. 
Patent systems come in many fonns. While TRIPS dictates 
minimum standards to which all WTO members must adhere, it 
reserves considerable discretion to member states to implement these 
standards. By exercising this flexibility judiciously, developing 
countries can avoid or at least minimize some of the burden that 
patent protection might otherwise entail. For example, operating a 
patent system on the rigorous, pre-grant examination model 
commonly practiced in developed countries requires funding and 
technical expertise beyond the reach of most developing nations.2o 
The U.S. patent office employs more than 5000 employees, many 
with advanced scientific or legal training at the cost of roughly a 
billion dollars per year.21 By comparison, the annual GDP of Malawi 
amounts to only two billion dollars.22 Yet, nothing in TRIPS 
mandates an ex-ante examination model. 
Deciding whether to conduct pre-grant examinations is only one of 
many choices for a developing nation to consider in order to make 
patent protection work for them. Creatively re-imagined, patent 
18. Decision of the Council for TRIPS of 29 November 2005, Extension of the Transition Period 
under Article 66.1 for Least-Developed Country Members, WT/IP/C/40 (Nov. 30, 2005). Patent 
protection for pharmaceuticals can be further deferred until 2016. World Trade Organization, Ministerial 
Conference, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health of 20 November 2001, ~7, 
WTIMIN(01)/DEc/2,44 I.L.M. 775 (2002). 
19. See HISAMITSU ARAI, POLICY ADVISORY COMM'N, WORW INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., 
iNTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICIES FOR THE TwENTY FIRST CENTURY: THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE IN 
WEALTH CREATION 12 (1999) (noting that countries bound by TRIPS' mandate colJectivelyaccount for 
90% of the world's population). 
20. Indeed, commentators have increasingly worried that maintaining this rigorous model appears 
beyond the ability of the U.S. itself. ByalJ accounts, threshold standards have falJen as the U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Office (PTO) has been overwhelmed by an exponentially rising flood of applications. Robert 
P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rightsfor Business Concepts 
and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 590 (1999). 
21. Exact figures are hard to come by because the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) is 
responsible for granting both patents and trademarks. However, the lion's share of resources is 
consumed by the patent side of operations, and the figures provided are estimates for the latter only. 
22. CIA, The World Factbook, Malawi, https:llwww.cia.govllibrary/publicationslthe-world-
factbooklgeoslmi.html (last visited January 18, 2008). 
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offices can play important roles in fostering development in ways that 
transcend the traditional IP incentive narrative. Prior scholarship has 
focused on ways in which developing nations can tailor the 
substantive standards governing patent protection?3 My intent here is 
not to duplicate such efforts. In any case, because TRIPS mandates a 
relatively high floor of substantive protection, developing countries 
have limited discretion to modulate these standards, and thus much of 
this doctrinal fine tuning matters only at the margins. By contrast, 
TRIPS has comparatively less to say about procedural and 
institutional design, leaving developing countries free to experiment 
on this front. 24 While perhaps less glamorous than substantive 
doctrine, procedural choices can have important systemic 
implications. To give one example, a consequence of choosing not to 
undertake pre-grant examinations may be relinquishing the ability to 
control the substantive standards under which patents issue?5 
Procedural choices can therefore determine patentability standards by 
default. 
Patent systems comprise multiple moving parts, each of which can 
serve as policy levers to achieve particular goals. This Article 
examines two such variables: pre-grant examinations of patentability 
and assessment of patent fees?6 It then considers the interaction 
between these variables and alternative models for regulating 
innovation outside the patent system. Analysis of each of these policy 
dimensions will not attempt to be exhaustive. Rather than cataloguing 
a comprehensive menu of policy options, my emphasis will instead 
be on the relationships between them: to explore how choices made 
in one aspect of patent policy affect decisions in others. The Article 
also includes a descriptive component: it examines what countries are 
23. See, e.g., Paul J. Heald, Mowing the Playing Field: Addressing Information Distortion and 
Asymmetry in the TRIPS Game, 88 MINN. L. REv. 249 (2003); Correa, supra note 12. 
24. Cf TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 1 ("Members shall be free to detennine the appropriate 
method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice"). 
25. MARKUS NOLFF, TRIPS, PCT AND GLOBAL PATENT PROCUREMENT 172 (2001). 
26. I focus on the acquisition of patent rights because doing so facilitates horizontal comparisons 
across national systems in that the issues concerned are largely patent-specific. By contrast, patent 
enforcement depends on judicial and administrative apparatus that serve broader institutional functions 
and thus implicate policy considerations extrinsic to the patent system. 
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actually doing, rather than discussing policy in the abstract. Lastly, 
the Article seeks to highlight the link between means and ends: a 
patent system can serve many purposes, and it matters how you 
prioritize among them. Our goal then is to understand how these 
different moving parts function together to advance particular 
objectives, within the constraints established by the regime of 
international IP & trade law. 
I. IDENTIFYING GOALS, CHOOSING PRIORITIES 
The most significant international constraint, and one on which this 
paper will focus, is the TRIPS Agreement, read within the larger 
context of the WTO trade law in which TRIPS is embedded. Article 
7 of TRIPS posits the treaty's objectives as follows: 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights 
should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation 
and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the 
mutual advantage of producers and users of technological 
knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic 
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations. 
Such carefully balanced language, combined with references in 
TRIPS' preamble to the "developmental . . . objectives" of IP 
protection,27 holds out the promise that TRIPS can be read to serve 
the interests of developing countries and not just those of the 
developed.28 The proclamation of the "Doha Development Round" 
and the World Intellectual Property Organization's (WIPO) own 
Development Agenda have reinforced expectations that IP protection 
27. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, pmbl, recitalS; see also id., pmbl., recital 6 (recognizing the 
"special needs of the least-developed country Members"). 
28. See also Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 
pmbl., recital 2, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154,33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement] (recognizing 
the "need for positive efforts" to benefit developing countries). 
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can be reconciled with development interests?9 Developing 
countries should not hesitate to take this promise at face value as they 
navigate the flexibilities that TRIPS provides. 
In order to decide what kind of patent system to opt for, however, a 
developing country first needs to decide what it hopes to get out of 
having one. In doing so, it helps to distinguish between different, 
albeit overlapping objectives of patent protection. Much of the debate 
thus far has focused on the role patents play in economic 
development. Development economists have long recognized the 
crucial role that technology plays in facilitating economic 
advancement. Investing in technology can dramatically improve a 
country's industrial efficiency, allowing it to migrate from the 
production of primary goods to value-added industries. The key 
question is whether patents help or hinder developing countries in 
their quest to acquire the technology they need. 
In general, there are three ways for developing countries to acquire 
technology. A country can (1) absorb established technologies by 
tapping the global public domain; (2) generate its own technological 
innovations; or (3) encourage the transfer of proprietary technologies 
by foreign firms.3o The effect that patents have on each of these 
acquisition strategies is hotly contested. 
On its face, patent protection would seem to hamper an absorption 
strategy by removing technologies from the public domain, raising 
their cost and restricting availability. However, patent proponents 
downplay such adverse effects, casting doubt on the ability of 
developing countries to absorb useful technologies "off the shelf' 
even in the absence of legal monopolies.31 Patent proponents also 
29. See generally Anselm Kamperman Sanders, Intellectual Property. Free Trade Agreements. and 
Economic Development, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 893 (2007). Indeed, the green-lighting of compulsory 
licensing achieved in the Doha Declaration can be seen as a first step in a larger campaign to rebalance 
international IP law in a more development-friendly light. See Sean Pager, TRIPS: A Link Too Far? A 
Proposal for Procedural Restraints on Regulatory Linkage in the WTO, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. 
REV. 215, 250-51 (2006). 
30. Maskus describes three potential channels for transfers of exogenous technology: foreign direct 
investment (FDI), licensing, and direct imports. Maskus, supra note II, at 481. 
31. See Kitsch, supra note 13, at 171-72 (arguing that "technology is not a collection of recipes" that 
can easily be absorbed from published patent specifications or technological literature); see also id. at 
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emphasize the positive role that patents can play in helping 
developing countries to acquire technology, both by inducing 
exogenous technology transfers and stimulating indigenous 
innovation. They dismiss the costs associated with patent protection 
as temporary hurdles outweighed by long-tenn gains.32 
Patents critics score the cost-benefit analysis much less favorably. 
They view patents as a serious obstacle to absorption strategies and 
of dubious relevance to indigenous innovation33 or technology 
transfer. 34Instead, they see TRIPS primarily as serving a "royalty-
collection" function, transferring monopoly rents from developing 
countries to IP producers in rich countries. 35 Such rents are not 
trivial-<>ne commentator estimated that Brazil would pay an extra 
$1.2 billion per year on foreign-held patents in TRIPS' aftennath.36 
Because such commentary often assumes that patents unifonnly 
help or hinder technological development, the policy prescriptions 
that follow generally reduce to a simple binary of positions that are 
predictably either "pro" or "con" patent: those who see patents as 
stimulating innovation advocate immediate and robust patent 
protection.37 Those who see patents as rent-seeking tools advocate 
176-177 (arguing that foreign technologies need to be adapted to suit the needs of developing countries, 
requiring patent incentives to encourage such adaptive innovation). 
32. See also id at 177 (arguing that patent fees can defray administrative costs and that royalty rates 
will held down by depressed demand). 
33. Skeptics argue that few developing countries are capable of large-scale, patentable innovation in 
their own right. Meanwhile, enforcing foreign patents may hinder the adaptation of existing technologies 
and restrict basic research. Lee Petherbridge, Comment, Intelligent TRIPS Implementation: A Strategy 
for Countries on the Cusp of Development, 25 U. PA. J. lNr'LEcON. L. 1133, 1162-64 (2004). 
34. Skeptics contend that technology transfer hinges on trade secret protection more than patents. 
Heald, supra note 23, at 258-59; but see Kitsch, supra note 13, at 174-75. Moreover, they suggest that 
by thinning out the patent thicket of blocking rights, developing countries might actually attract 
investment in technologies such as biotech under a low-protection regime. /d. at 285; Petherbridge, 
supra note 33, at 1164. 
35. See Jagdish Bhagwati, After Seattle: Free Trade and the WTO, 77 lNr'L AFF. 15, 26 (2001) 
(describing TRIPs as "tum[ing] the WTO into a royalty-collection agency"); Maskus, supra note II, at 
493 (estimating U.S. gains in static rent transfers from TRIPS as amounting to "a net inflow of some 
$5.8 billion per year," while developing countries would experience a net outflow-which for Brazil 
alone would total around $1.2 billion per year). 
36. Maskus, supra note II, at 493. 
37. Some commentators have called for developing countries to voluntarily implement patent 
protection even before TRIPS' grace period has expired. Others go further and advocate adopting 
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damage control strategies that seek to limit the costs of patents by 
adopting the minimum degree of protection necessary to remain 
TRIPS-compliant. 
As between these two philosophical extremes, it is probably fair to 
say that most developing countries themselves incline to a position of 
patent skepticism. Such skepticism was reinforced by the manner in 
which TRIPS was negotiated. Rich countries essentially presented a 
comprehensive proposal for IP protection as a fait accompli to which 
developing countries eventually acquiesced in return for trade 
concessions unrelated to intellectual property. 38 For developing 
countries, the operating assumption going into TRIPS was therefore 
that IP rights represented a net loss made palatable only as part of an 
overall package deal that compensated them in other ways.39 
In fact, the true picture is probably more complex. Patents can 
assist some aspects of technological advancement while impeding 
others. The mix of costs and benefits will likely vary according to the 
individual circumstances of each country. Moreover, even assuming 
that patents do, in fact, represent a net loss to developing countries, a 
policy of minimal compliance might not be the only rational 
response. Even developing countries that see patents as a losing 
prospect overall should nonetheless remain attuned to the possible 
benefits that a patent system might bring. Pursuing such proverbial 
silver linings need not translate into a monolithic set of "pro patent" 
policies. To some extent, developing countries can pick and choose, 
tailoring patent policies according to their specific priorities.4o 
Technological benefits that developing countries may contemplate 
in structuring their patent system include: (1) providing incentives 
standards of IP protection that go beyond the minimum requirements of TRIPS. See Sherwood, supra 
note I, at 494. 
38. See Peter Drahos, Negotiating Intellectual Property Rights: Between Coercion and Dialogue, in 
GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT 167-69 (peter 
Drahos & Ruth Mayne eds., 2002). 
39. See Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 369, 371-72 
(2006). 
40. J.H. Reichman & David Lange, Bargaining around the TRIPS Agreement: The Case/or Ongoing 
Public-Private Initiatives to Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual Property Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMPo 
& INT'L L. 11,23 (1998). 
HeinOnline -- 23 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 764 2006-2007
764 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:4 
and support for indigenous innovation; (2) encouraging local 
entrepreneurship; (3) disseminating knowledge of foreign 
technologies to the public; (4) encouraging the transfer of proprietary 
technology by foreign companies; and (5) creating incentives to 
develop or adapt technologies to meet specific national needs. 
Ancillary benefits may include: (6) generating revenues from patent 
fees; (7) developing a reservoir of technical and scientific expertise; 
and (8) providing jobs to local graduates. Patent systems should also 
be designed with a view to minimizing costs, such as: (9) conserving 
institutional resources devoted to administration; (10) preventing 
anticompetitive abuse of patent rights; and (11) limiting the flow of 
rents to foreign patent-holders; and (12) preserving the public 
domain.41 
These goals are not mutually exclusive and may well overlap in 
terms of the policy prescriptions to which they point. However, 
different priorities will lead to different emphases. For example, high 
patent fees can serve both to deter patenting (aiding goals #11 and 
#12 above) and also to generate revenue (#5): a country prioritizing 
the former would push fees upward as high as possible, while a 
country favoring the latter would instead choose a fee level at a point 
along the demand curve at which maximum revenue is obtained. 
Similarly, while stronger patent rights might be predicted to promote 
technological advancement both through external technology 
transfers and from indigenous innovation, the specific conditions 
under which these mechanisms function vary.42 Accordingly, a 
developing country might structure its IP regime differently 
depending on which sort of innovation it wishes to emphasize.43 
The choices made may depend on the country's current level of 
economic and technological development. In general, one can trace a 
41. A further consideration for some countries may be ongoing initiatives to harmonize global patent 
standards. This international dimension could cut two ways: some developing countries may wish to 
align themselves with emerging international norms to ease future transitions. Others may want to hold 
out with contrarian positions that can be deployed as bargaining chips in future negotiations. 
42. See infra notes 45-55 and accompanying text. 
43. See infra notes 204-08 and accompanying text (re: utility models as alternative protection 
scheme). 
HeinOnline -- 23 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 765 2006-2007
2007) PATENTS ON A SHOESTRING 765 
natural progression from low to high levels of IP protection as 
countries develop.44 Below a certain level of development, 
intellectual property rights are arguably irrelevant.45 Severely 
underdeveloped countries are typically engaged in subsistence 
agriculture, with little ability to innovate. They may also lack 
functioning legal and administrative mechanisms to enforce IP 
rights.46 Foreign patent-holders are less likely to worry about such 
countries engaging technological "piracy" and may see no prospect 
of surplus resources from which to extract monopoly rents.47 Such 
countries may formally participate in international IP regimes. Yet, 
patent laws have very little effect in practice. 
As a country develops, its domestic industries need access to 
technology to progress. Initially, weak patent laws (or weak 
enforcement) appear desirable because such industries lack the ability 
to generate patentable innovations and typically favor a strategy of 
absorption instead. Moreover, siphoning of royalties by external 
rights-holders may threaten macroeconomic stability. Eventually, as a 
country moves upward along the development ladder, its attitude to 
intellectual property rights evolves. As domestic industries 
themselves begin to innovate, they acquire their own stake in 
enforcing IP rights. Levels ofIP protection then begin to rise again.48 
These historical trends suggest that the optimal patent policy for a 
developing country will vary according its level of development. 
Some commentators, however, reject such received historical 
44. Recent empirical work by Keith Maskus suggests that the relationship between IPR & 
development is not entirely linear, but rather follows an inverted V-shaped shape, whereby ''the apparent 
strength of patent rights first falls as incomes rise" but then reverses direction to strengthen steadily "as 
development proceeds ... accelerat[ing] at a high income levels." Maskus, supra note II, at 477 
(describing regression analysis of patent protection in seventy-two countries between 1985 and 1990, 
which suggested $2,000 per capita GOP as the level at which patent protection becomes weakest, with 
rapid acceleration in IPR at incomes levels above $7,750). This apparent anomaly is probably explained 
by preexisting IP laws that many developing countries inherited from former colonial powers that are 
subsequently jettisoned. 
45. Petherbridge, supra note 33, at 1146; Gervais, supra note 13, at 519. 
46. Maskus, supra note II, at 478. 
47. Sherwood, supra note I, at 493. 
48. Maskus, supra note II, at 477-78. Korea offers a prototypical example ofa country that migrated 
from IP "pirate" to "protectionist" as it developed. 
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wisdom. They insist that developing countries can immediately 
benefit from strengthening patent protection. Some argue that 
developing countries contain a hidden reservoir of untapped inventive 
potential and that the failure of patent laws to unleash such 
indigenous innovation has to do with cultural barriers that 
governments can overcome through outreach and education.49 Others 
contend that by attracting foreign investment developing countries 
can acquire cutting-edge technologies that will enable them to 
leapfrog across the development divide and immediately embrace the 
state-of-the-art. 50 The failure of developing countries to embrace 
strong IP laws voluntarily, it is suggested, has to do with 
dysfunctional public choice dynamics rather than rational self-
interest, which lead them down a dead-end path of protectionism and 
"piracy" at expense of long-term technological competitiveness. 51 
IP skeptics counter that TRIPS already imposes a relatively high 
floor of mandatory IP protection. The question therefore is whether 
developing countries have anything to gain from going beyond 
TRIPS' minimum requirements. 52 We should not assume that rich 
country levels of IP protection represent the "optimal" or "rational" 
choice. Perversions of public choice are hardly unknown even in 
mature democracies,53 and many argue that patent standards in 
49. SHERWOOD, supra note 11 (describing unfamiliarity with IP laws and lack of entrepreneurial 
tradition as primary obstacles to indigenous innovation rather than lack of technological capability); see 
also Bruce Lehman, Intellectual Property Rights as a Trade, Health and Economic Development Issue, 
17 ST. JOHN'S I. LEGAL COMMENT. 417,424 (2003) (noting that "the talent exists, but ... that talent is 
not being exploited back horne"). 
50. I.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition under the TRIPS 
Agreement, 29N.Y.U. J. INT'LL. & POL. 11,80 (1997). 
51. Domestic industries have a natural bias toward free riding-why pay for something you can get 
for free? They can also be expected to oppose FDI as a source of foreign competition. However, 
appeasing such economic interests may not benefit the country as a whole. 
52. Fine-tuning of IP standards, in any case, may matter far less in practice than how such laws are 
enforced. See W. Lesser, The Effects of TRIPS-Mandated Intellectual Property Rights On Economic 
Activities in Developing Countries (WIPO Research Paper, 2001), available at 
http://www . wipo.intlabout -ip/ enlstudieslpdf7ssa _lesser_trips. pdf. 
53. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 262-63 (2003) (Breyer, I., dissenting) (decrying 
capture of copyright system by rightsholders); Robert Denicola, Some Thoughts on the Dynamics of 
Federal Trademark Legislation and the Trademark Dilution Act of 1995,59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
75, 80-83 (1996) (same for trademark law). 
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developed countries now exceed optimal levels even for advanced 
post-industrial economies, let alone for developing ones. 54 
In any case, a country's patent policies are likely to be influenced 
by more than just its economic and technological development. 
Individual circumstances are also likely to dictate where it sees its 
advantage lying. For example, some countries have a clear advantage 
in attracting technology-intensive foreign direct investment (FDI) due 
to such non-IP variables as market size, openness to trade, education, 
infrastructure, political stability, rule of law, etc. Some have more 
obvious prospects of nurturing domestic innovation within 
established industries or advanced research institutions, or by tapping 
entrepreneurial traditions. Financial and market structures can affect 
each of these appraisals, as can political constraints, either internal 
(e.g., rooted in ideology or cultural tradition) or external (e.g., a 
dependency on foreign aid or other vulnerability to diplomatic 
pressure). 
Such complex variables counsel against a "one size fits all" 
solution to patent system design. 55 Each country should undertake a 
holistic appraisal of its circumstances in order to integrate its IP 
policy with its overall development agenda and prioritize objectives 
accordingly. To some extent, such decisions involve a leap of faith. 
TRIPS has ushered in a new era that calls for experimentation. The 
benefits and costs of patent protection remain uncertain and 
contested. On the big questions, reasonable minds can disagree. 
Rather than resolve such fundamental debates, this paper takes it 
for granted that different countries will arrive at different normative 
54. Correa, supra note 12; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for 
Business, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 263,274 (2000) (critiquing the trend in IP 
law toward excessive protection without any underlying rationale); see also MASKUS, supra note 3, at 
65--66 (U.S. intellectual property "regime has become overly protectionist by almost any utilitarian 
standard ... it seems unwise to advocate the exportation of such protection to developing nations"). Any 
discussion of "optimal standards" or "levels" necessarily collapses a complex array of doctrinal 
elements into a single, misleading variable. In practice, developing country must navigate a long menu 
of doctrinal options to design a patent regime tailored to its national interests. See generally Robert M. 
Sherwood, Intellectual Property Systems and Investment Stimulation: The Rating of Systems in Eighteen 
Developing Countries, 37 IDEA 261 (1997) (developing a numerical rating system to measure the 
strength of IP rights in developing countries). 
55. See Reichman & Lange, supra note 40, at 50. 
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positions vis-a-vis patent protection. For purposes of this paper, we 
can identify four distinct "strategic profiles" with which developing 
countries might identify. The first two fall within the ranks of patent 
skeptics. The second two see a possible upside to patents, albeit to 
varying degrees. 
1. The Passive Minimalist 
In many developing countries, the level of patenting activity is so 
low that it makes patent policy virtually irrelevant in the short term.56 
Countries in this camp include those with low levels of development, 
small populations, and/or isolated economies.57 For these countries, it 
may make sense to take the path of least resistance: to implement a 
patent registration system that complies with TRIPS, pocket the fees 
received, but otherwise not expend much effort in fine-tuning 
substantive or procedural standards. 
2. The Substantive Minimalist 
Developing countries who feel they have more to lose from patent 
protection will choose a more active course of resistance. We can call 
them "Substantive Minimalists" because their goal is to test the floor 
of TRIPS' minimum requirements and fully exploit the flexibilities 
that TRIPS allows. 58 This could entail crafting restnctlve 
patentability criteria, 59 defining substantive rights narrowly,60 or 
56. Petherbridge, supra note 33, at 1146. 
57. See BISWAJIT OHAR & C. NIRANJAN RAo, INDIA HABITAT CENTRE, INTERNATIONAL PATENT 
SYSTEM: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 17, 21 (2002), available at hUp:/Iwww.wipo.intlabout-
ip/enistudieslpdflstudL b _ dhar.pdf. 
58. Countries subscribing to either Substantive or Passive Minimalism will be referred to 
collectively as patent skeptics, denoting their shared position of skepticism toward patents. 
59. A restrictive patentability standard could include establishing a high originality bar, requiring 
absolute novelty, andlor defining patentable subject matter narrowly (e.g., invoking the exclusions 
permitted under TRIPS Article 27 for living matter, therapeutic methods and "morality"-and not 
allowing software, business models, algorithms, natural isolates, etc. to qualifY as "inventions"). See. 
e.g., Petherbridge, supra note 33, at 1165-67. 
60. E.g., literal claim interpretation only (no doctrine of equivalents). [d. at 1168. 
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recognlzmg expansive defenses to infringement,61 all as part of a 
damage control strategy to minimize the costs of patent protection. 
Such countries may also deploy procedural obstacles to patenting, 
such as third-party opposition proceedings or costly translation 
requirements.62 Indeed, the more idiosyncratic the rules such 
countries adopt, the higher the associated costs of patenting, thereby 
encouraging foreign inventors to forgo the incremental benefits of 
acquiring patent rights in that territory and instead to concentrate on 
"softer" targets elsewhere. To be sure, TRIPS has provisions 
designed to limit overt obstructionist tactics.63 The analysis here 
assumes that Substantive Minimalists will operate within these limits, 
exploiting only such policy tools as can be defended in good faith.64 
3. The Nativist 
A third category will be developing countries that see patent 
protection as having genuine potential to stimulate indigenous 
innovation but worry about the burden of monopoly rents extracted 
by foreign patent-holders. These countries will seek to craft patent 
policies that favor domestic inventors while still maintaining barriers 
against foreign applicants. Such discriminatory policies can be 
problematic under TRIPS' national treatment provision. The 
challenge therefore will be to employ legitimate (i.e., presumptively 
defensible) policy tools to achieve the desired effects. For example, 
discounting patent fees for small businesses will tend to favor local 
inventors over foreign multinationals. Yet, it can be justified on 
normative grounds independent of its discriminatory effects.65 
61. Defenses can consist of both shields (prior user rights, experimental use) and swords (antitrust, 
inequitable conduct, abuse ofrights, etc.). 
62. Other examples of procedural hurdles might include limits on the number of claims allowable; 
requirements of specialized drafting format; placing the burden of proof on the applicant to establish 
patentability; according no presumption of validity once patents have issued; high maintenance fees; 
expansive disclosure requirement; enforcing patent working requirements; compulsory licenses; etc. 
63. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 41, 62. 
64. Of course, where one draws the line is the subject of legitimate debate. Compare Heald, supra 
note 23, at 275 (advocating aggressive minimalist approach), with Gervais, supra note 13, at 525 
(dismissing search for loopholes as "legal 'gimmickry'''). 
65. See infra notes 183-85 and accompanying text. 
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4. The Globalist 
The final category of developing countries will be those ready to 
embrace the global patent system. They may do so to lure foreign 
investors, making it easy for the latter to acquire patent rights and 
signaling a commitment to fully enforce patents once granted. For 
newly industrializing countries who have reached relatively advanced 
stages of development, a "globalist" profile may be prompted by the 
need of their own indigenous inventors to secure patent rights abroad. 
Globalists will gravitate toward patent policies that mirror established 
international norms. 
These profiles represent ideal types whose boundaries will overlap 
in practice. Countries may combine elements of more than one 
strategy, or transition from one profile to another over time.66 
Moreover, public choice theory warns us that it may be a mistake to 
think of such countries as following coherent "strategies" per se; in 
many cases, patent policies will emerge piecemeal as the product of 
ongoing internal contests between domestic constituencies with 
widely diverging interests. Nonetheless, by distinguishing between 
these strategic profiles, however artificially, we can highlight 
important differences in policy orientation. The analysis that follows 
traces the implications of these distinct strategies across the three 
policy dimensions identified above: patent examinations, patent fees, 
and alternative protection models. 
II. PATENT SYSTEM DESIGN 101 - OPTIONS & IMPUCA TIONS 
A. Examination Options 
Perhaps the most important procedural decision a country needs to 
make is to decide the extent to which it will conduct examinations 
prior to issuing a patent to determine whether applications conform to 
substantive patentability standards (novelty, non-obviousness, 
66. Cf Reichman & Lange, supra note 40, at 53 (advocating a policy of "tailor-made adjustments of 
the intellectual property fences in developing countries" that adjusts standards on a case-by-case basis). 
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enablement, etc.). Patent examinations serve as a filter to screen out 
undeserving claims before they mature into a patent grant. However, 
they can be enormously demanding in time and resources. 
1. Registration Model 
a. Pure Registration 
For Passive Resisters, a low volume of patent applications may not 
justify the expense of conducting in-depth examinations. One way 
they can avoid these costs is to forego substantive examinations 
entirely and adopt a registration system whereby patents are reviewed 
solely for compliance with procedural formalities.67 Determinations 
of validity only occur later if an infringement claim is brought.68 
Since most patents are never enforced, this dramatically reduces the 
overall costs of such review.69 However, failure to conduct pre-grant 
examinations can open the door to abusive patenting practices, 
encouraging spurious claims that could be used in terrorem against 
competitors and the public at large.7o Investors might also be 
unwilling to back business ventures resting on untested patents. For 
these reasons, many developed countries-including the U.S.-that 
experimented with registration systems ended up reverting to an 
examination model.71 
67. DHAR & RAo, supra note 57, at 10. South Africa offers an example ofa country that relies on a 
pure registration model. Lehman, supra note 49, at 425. 
68. Challenges to patent validity are commonly raised as defenses to infringement. However, if the 
burden is on defendants to raise the challenge, in some cases, validity review may still not occur even 
then. 
69. Cf Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw.U. L. REv. 1495 (2001). 
70. Such overreaching patent claims can translate into market leverage even if they would be 
invalidated once the patentee tried to enforce them. Patent litigation is so expensive that competitors 
might shy away from challenging the patent. The mere threat of an infringement claim might be enough 
to convince potential infringers to negotiate a license. South Africa attempts to cure this defect by 
allowing for pre-grant opposition proceedings to filter out undeserving applications. However, this 
assumes there will be local entities motivated to challenge pending registrations, which often may not be 
the case. See infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text. 
71. John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 714-
15 (2002). But see F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of 
Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55 (2003). 
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b. Re-registration: Examination by Proxy 
Since most patents filed in developing countries are also the 
subject of patent applications elsewhere, a better approach is to 
piggyback on the review conducted by foreign patent offices. The 
simplest way to do this is to rely on the issuance of a foreign patent 
directly as an assurance of validity. Unsurprisingly, this approach has 
appealed to small countries with limited administrative resources. For 
example, to register a patent in Hong Kong, applicants must 
demonstrate their receipt of an equivalent patent (with identical 
claims) issued either by China, the United Kingdom, or the European 
Patent Office (EPO).72 Many other countries appear to operate a de 
facto re-registration model, giving heavy weight to foreign patents, 
albeit informally. 73 Such "examination by proxy" combines the 
efficiency of a registration system with assurance of substantive 
review by a professional patent staff elsewhere. 74 
A re-registration model has its drawbacks, however. Even more 
than a pure registration system, it limits the ability for developing 
countries to control substantive patentability standards or even 
procedural rules for claim drafting. 75 It can also severely 
disadvantage local inventors who may have difficulty accessing (and 
paying for) patent procurement overseas, thereby inhibiting local 
72. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN ASIA § 4.02 (Arthur Wineburg, ed., 2d ed. 2004). 
Patents issued by the EPO are accepted only where the United Kingdom has been designated a covered 
territory. [d. Several South Pacific island nations also operate re-registration systems: the Solomon 
Islands, Tuvalu, Tonga, Vanuatu, and Kiribati only accept patents issued by the United Kingdom. 
Micronesia requires a U.S. patent. Nauru accepts patents from Australia, the UK, or the U.S. Samoa 
seems the most ecumenical. It recognizes patent granted by any overseas country. See INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAWS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Hendrik Vanhees ed., 2006). 
73. NOLFF, supra note 25, at 143. Even relatively large, developed countries such as Canada may be 
included among this group. [d. 
74. Re-registration schemes are also known as ''validation systems." Setsuko Asami, A View toward 
the Global Patent: Mutual Exploitation of Examination Results, 27 AIPPI J. 12 (2002). 
75. NOLFF, supra note 25, at 172. Under a pure registration model, a country can still develop its 
own customized patentability standards that are applied, albeit belatedly, during infringement actions. 
By contrast, countries following a patent re-registration model wiII face pressure to align their standards 
with the foreign proxies that they recognize. While it is possible to tolerate minor discrepancies under a 
rule that re-registration serves only as prima facie evidence of validity, going beyond that would 
introduce an unwelcome element of uncertainty. 
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innovation.76 Perhaps for these reasons, many countries have moved 
away from a re-registration model. 77 
Furthermore, selective re-registration schemes could run into legal 
challenges. Most countries recognize foreign patents only from 
certain countries, often based on former colonial ties. Yet, privileging 
patents granted by certain countries over others could violate the 
most favored nation (MFN) principle of TRIPS. 78 The MFN 
principle forbids WTO members from favoring nationals of one 
member state over another.79 On its face, discriminating between 
patent offices would not violate MFN because anyone can apply to 
the designated offices to obtain a patent, regardless of their 
nationality.80 However, one can argue that nationals of the favored 
offices, in practice, would enjoy a de facto advantage in that they 
would find it easier to navigate the patent procurement process in 
their home country. 8 I Indeed, in many cases, they would have 
obtained a patent at home already and thus not incur any extra 
expense or inconvenience. Consider, for example, a New Zealand 
company and British company that each seek to export their patented 
products to Vanuatu. The British company could so immediately, 
obtaining a Vanuatu patent based on their preexisting British patent. 
76. Id. at 147; OHAR & RAO, supra note 57, at 20. Unless the re-registration scheme includes a 
translation requirement, the original patent application may be filed in a foreign language, inhibiting 
dissemination of technical information domestically. See Asami, supra note 74. 
77. NOLFF, supra note 25, at 146 (citing evidence of trend in African jurisdictions). 
78. Another potential obstacle might be Paris Convention, Article 4bis which states that "[p]atents 
applied for in the various countries of the Union ... shall be independent of patents obtained for the 
same invention in other countries." Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 4bis, 
Mar. 20, 1883, as last revised July 14, 1967,21 U.S.T. 1583,828 U.N.T.S. 305 (1967) [hereinafter Paris 
Convention].This provision most likely governs only the substantive grant of rights, not the procedural 
foundation on which such rights were based. However, it might come into play if are-registration 
scheme tied invalidation to the fate of the original reference patent. NOLFF, supra note 25, at 149 n.43 7. 
79. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 4. 
80. Moreover, the principle of national treatment (in theory) ensures that foreign nationals are not 
disadvantaged as against locals in making such applications. National treatment, like MFN, is a rule of 
non-discrimination, but it only applies to preferential treatment of nationals over foreigners, whereas 
MFN applies to discrimination between foreigners. See id. art. 3. 
81. Of course, a degree of home court advantage is inherent in a system of national patent rights. 
One would not normally think of such insider advantages as violating national treatment just because 
locals can work the system better than foreigners. The difference here is that there is no inherent reason 
why British subjects should be better able to procure patents in Vanuatu than New Zealanders. 
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By contrast, the New Zealand ftrm would have to apply specially for 
a patent in the United Kingdom, despite already having a New 
Zealand patent and having no intention of exporting their product to 
Britain. 
While MFN is long-established principle ofintemational trade law, 
its application in the context of intellectual property is a recent 
innovation that remains undertheorized. 82 Because intellectual 
property presents a substantially different context than trade, existing 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade eGA TT) precedent may 
provide an uncertain guide.83 Nonetheless, recent WTO authority 
suggests that such indirect discrimination could result in an 
actionable MFN claim under TRIPS.84 In a 2006 decision on the 
European Community's (EC) regulations on geographical indication 
(GIs), a WTO panel found that the EC had improperly applied a 
reciprocity requirement whereby the EC would only protect foreign 
GIs from countries that offered comparable protection to European 
Gls.85 The panel dismissed the EC's objection that the discrimination 
82. MFN was introduced to international IP law by TRIPS in 1995. Earlier international IP treaties 
such as the Berne and Paris Conventions contained only national treatment provisions, but not MFN. See 
Reichman & Lange, supra note 40. One important issue left open is whether TRIPS' MFN is subject to 
the exception provided by GAIT Article XXIV that sanctions trade discrimination where "necessary to 
the formation" free trade agreements (FT As) and customs unions. See General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, art. XXIV, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-lI, 55 U.N.T.S. 1944 [hereinafter GATT]. For example, 
patents conferred by the European Patent Office are recognized through extension agreements with 
several Balkan nations that are not themselves members of the European Patent Organization but which 
do have free trade agreements with the European Community. It is unclear whether, in principle, the 
existence of the latter could offer a defense to an MFN claim under TRIPS. See generally UNITED 
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD) & INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR 
TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (ICTSD), REsOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT: 
AN AUTHORITATIVE AND PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 79-82 (2005) [hereinafter 
UNCT AD RESOURCE BOOK] (discussing possible free trade exception to TRIPS MFN). 
83. See Reichman & Lange, supra note 40, at 63 ("[T]he MFN clause that applies to knowledge 
goods under [TRIPS] ... is not the same MFN clause that ... applie[s] to trade in tangible goods under 
the GAIT'). 
84. The fact that several countries currently award patents on this potentially discriminatory basis 
offers little assurance that the practice would be upheld. Given the limited number and relatively small 
size of the countries currently operating selective patent re-registration systems, it has probably not been 
worth anyone's while to object. That would not be true if the practice spread more widely, especially in 
light of recent precedent. See infra notes 85, 88, 91. 
85. Panel Report, European Communities--Protection o/Trademarks and Geographic Indication/or 
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, ~ 7.441, WTIDS I 741R (Mar. 15,2005) [hereinafter EC-GI case]. 
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was based on the location of the GI, not the nationality of the rights-
holder, holding that the reciprocity rule clearly inured to the benefit 
of EC nationals in practice.86 While the panel reached its analysis 
under TRIPS' national treatment provision, the same logic would 
have applied to the MFN claim in that case.87 Substitute "location of 
patent office" for "location of GI" and arguably you have the case at 
hand. One could attempt to distinguish the two cases by arguing that 
many foreigners do, in practice, routinely apply for British and/or 
U.S. patents, and thus the de facto disadvantage caused by privileging 
patents from these offices would be less extreme. However, if the 
grounds for choosing which patent offices get favored are entirely 
arbitrary then even a slight disadvantage would likely still be 
actionable.88 
The safest solution would be to defuse the issue entirely and accept 
all foreign patents as presumptively valid, as does Samoa.89 Yet, this 
creates the potential for legal uncertainty due to incompatible 
standards: patents rejected in one foreign office may have been 
approved in another.9o To defuse such conflicts by adopting an all-
embracing standard would mean opening the floodgates to foreign 
patents and entirely abdicating control over patentability decisions. 
Many countries will also be uncomfortable delegating patentability 
decisions to less established patent offices whose judgment might 
Geographical Indications are a variant of trademarks that protect goods whose "quality, reputation or 
other characteristic ... is essentially attributable to [their] geographical origin." See TRIPS Agreement, 
supra note 2, art. 22. 
86. As the panel pointed out, even though it was possible for foreigners to own, e.g., French 
vineyards that benefit from EC protection and also for Europeans to own foreign GI assets which did not 
benefit, in practice, the reverse would overwhelmingly be true in both cases. EC-GI case, supra note 85, 
'\17.272. 
87. The panel declined to address the MFN claim on judicial economy grounds. Id. at'll 7.716. 
However, one could easily hypothesize two non-EC nationals, one based in a country which does meet 
the EC's reciprocity requirement and another in a country which does not. The same discrimination 
analysis would then apply. 
88. Cf Appellate Body Report, United States--Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, '\I 165-66, 176, WTIDS58/ABIR (Oct. 8, 1998) (adopted Nov. 6, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp 
Turtle] (arbitrarily imposing inflexible standard without inquiring into actual conditions prevailing in 
regulated countries constitutes unlawful discrimination under GAIT Article XX). 
89. See supra note 72. 
90. NOLFF, supra note 25, at 146. 
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prove unreliable. To circumvent the latter concern, countries could 
accord recognition selectively to patent offices chosen based on 
objective indicia of institutional competency. For example, accepting 
only patents granted by patent offices which are accredited as 
International Search Authorities (lSA) and/or International 
Preliminary Exam Authorities (IPEA) under the Patent Cooperation 
Treaty might dispel any inference of discriminatory favoritism. 
Under WTO precedent, de facto discrimination is not actionable 
where a non-discriminatory objective that serves a legitimate need 
can be demonstrated. 9 I Yet, the problem of incompatible standards 
would remain. 
A country might resolve this latter concern by only recognizing 
patents issued by countries that enforce compatible standards of 
patentability. In principle such a rationale could legitimize re-
registration schemes based on colonial ties, to the extent that 
common legal standards are a legacy of colonial rule.92 However, to 
avoid an MFN challenge, such countries would probably need to 
provide a mechanism to review and certify the compatibility of other 
WTO member state standards on a non-discriminatory basis.93 
2. In-House Review 
Unlike Passive Resisters, Substantive Minimalists are unlikely to 
be willing to cede control over patentability standards to the extent 
that a registration model requires. Conducting patentability reviews 
in-house allows such countries to tailor standards to their needs. By 
enforcing narrow standards of patentability, they can limit economic 
losses to foreign patent-holders. The capacity for in-house review 
91. See Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, W 7.92, 7.101, 
WTIDS1l41R (March 17,2000) [hereinafter Canada Pharmaceuticals] ("Article 27 does not prohibit 
bona fide exemptions to deal with problems that may exist only in certain product areas."). Canada 
Pharmaceuticals was an Article 27 case but the panel explicitly drew on GAIT precedent from MFN 
and national treatment cases in undertaking its discrimination analysis. 
92. See OHAR & RAo, supra note 57, at II. 
93. Cj Shrimp Turtle, supra note 88, 'II 165-66, 176 (certifying environmental standard met by 
certain countries while failing to consider comparable regulation by others constituted unjustifiable and 
arbitrary discrimination). 
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also makes it easier to conduct opposition proceedings, allowing third 
parties to challenge patents without incurring the costs and risks of 
litigation. Such proceedings can serve as a further safeguard against 
invalid patents and perhaps provide an additional deterrent to 
prospective applicants.94 
In-house examinations may also appeal to Nativists because it 
allows them to build expertise and technical capabilities that can 
foster indigenous innovation. By assembling a technical staff able to 
navigate complex patent procedures, a patent office can assist local 
entrepreneurs in patenting their inventions both at home and 
intemationally.95 A patent office can also function proactively by 
conducting outreach and education campaigns to educate prospective 
inventors about the benefits of the patent system, 96 or by contributing 
to technology incubation programs. More generally, patent offices 
can serve as conduits for technology transfers to local industries.97 
F or example, Peru and Guinea have instituted ambitious programs to 
mine global patent disclosures to identify useful technologies and 
disseminate them to local finns.98 
Accumulating a staff of highly trained patent examiners can yield 
other collateral benefits. Developing countries often suffer from a 
"brain drain" whereby highly qualified graduates end up emigrating 
due to a lack of opportunities at home.99 A patent office can help to 
94. See infra notes 128-131 and accompanying text. 
95. Some attention will need to be paid to ensure that special assistance to local inventors does not 
run afoul of national treatment rules prohibiting discrimination against foreigners. However, as a 
practical matter, many of the measures described here are unlikely to appeal to foreign applicants, who 
are typically sophisticated multinational companies. Moreover, TRIPS only requires national treatment 
with respect to "matters affecting the availability, acquisition, scope, maintenance and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights." Developing countries can argue that offering strategic consulting to local 
inventors regarding patent acquisitions as part of a broader "technology incubation" program falls 
outside this requirement since foreigners can still apply for and enforce their patents on an equal footing. 
96. See SHERWOOD, supra note II (describing vital "teaching role" played by patent offices in 
developing countries). 
97. As discussed below, the WPIS service offered by WIPO can assist in this regard as well. See 
infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text. However, local patents offices can serve both as 
intermediaries and publicists for WPIS' services. 
98. Conversation with Doris Long, Professor of Law and Chair, Intellectual Property, 
Information Technology and Privacy Group, John Marshall Law School, Atlanta, GA (Mar. 23, 2007). 
99. Lehman, supra note 49, at 424. 
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counteract this trend and put that brainpower to productive use. For 
example, Albert Einstein began his career as a technical assistant in 
the Swiss Patent Office. Unable to find an academic post, he made 
some of his most important scientific contributions (including 
publishing his theory of special relativity) while still a civil 
servant. 100 The professional expertise assembled in a patent office can 
also assist with policy decisions, e.g., advising government ministries 
on technical issues. Alternatively, a patent office can rely on outside 
consultants from government or academia to advise on patent issues, 
helping to cross-subsidize their retention. 101 Either way, some of this 
"human capital" will eventually cross over to the private sector, 
benefiting existing enterprises or starting new ones. 
Despite these benefits, developing countries often lack the 
institutional capacity to conduct patent examinations in-house. 102 
Patent applications span a daunting array of technical fields and often 
comprise hundreds of pages of technical specifications. Assessing 
their validity requires the ability to comb though and evaluate a 
voluminous and complex scientific literature and render judgments 
on cutting edge issues of technology.103 Such reviews can be costly 
and administratively demanding, requiring access to scientific 
materials and sophistical technical capabilities, all of which will 
frequently be in short supply.104 Attempting in-house examinations 
100. See Albert Einstein, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikiJAlbert_Einstein (last visited Jan. 18, 
2008). 
10 I. For example, in Chile, universities are frequently tapped to advise on patents. In Brazil, the 
Ministry of Health assists in the examination of pharmaceutical patents. Indeed, the very institution of 
patent examinations was inaugurated by France, relying on its Academy of Science. Lesser, supra note 
52; Sherwood, supra note I; Hon. Bruce A. Lehman, Chairman, International Intellectual Property 
Institute, Addressing the Crises of the Global Patent System (Oct. 2004), available at 
http://www.iipi.org/speechesiSingaporeI005.pdf;Duffy.supranote71.at 714. 
102. As Bruce Lehman, former Commission of the U.S. PTO, observes: 
[T]he number of patent offices capable of effectively searching and examining in all 
fields of technology is very small. There are only 10 patent offices in the world that 
qualifY as international searching authorities and international preliminary examining 
authorities under articles 16 and 32 of the Patent Cooperation Treaty. And, most of these 
offices lack comprehensive capability to examine in all technologies. 
Hon. Bruce A. Lehman, Chairman, International Intellectual Property Institute, Addressing the Crises of 
the Global Patent System (Oct. 2004), available at http://www.iipi.org/speeches/SingaporeI005.pdf 
103. Lesser, supra note 52, ch. 7. 
104. Id. 
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without adequate resources can lead to flawed or erratic patentability 
reviews that can cause more problems than they solve. Many 
developing countries may conclude that they are better off directing 
their scarce resources to other tasks. 
3. Outsourcing Examination 
For this reason, most developing countries will choose to outsource 
some or all of the substantive examination process. To do so means 
foregoing some ability to control standards of patentability. 
Therefore, a patent office might choose to do this only with regard to 
technologies for which it lacks in-house expertise. An office might 
also outsource only part of the examination process, for example, 
delegating determinations of novelty and non-obviousness which 
require time-consuming searches for prior art, while maintaining 
control over subject matter and utility which may be easier to 
evaluate internally. In this way, developing countries could reduce 
the burden and expense of examining patents in-house, while 
gradually building the capacity to do so in long term. 
a. Regional Organization 
One way for developing countries to offload some of the burden of 
conducting patent examinations is to join together in regional 
organizations. The WTO strongly advocated this solution in its Doha 
Declaration. 105 
Regional organizations vary in the extent to which they apply a 
unitary patent law across all member states. l06 They also differ in the 
105. Council for TRIPS, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, ~ 6(ii), WTIU540 (Aug. 30, 2003) (calling for "the development of 
systems providing for the grant of regional patents [to] be promoted" and committing "developed 
country Members ... to provide technical cooperation" to this end."). 
106. The Organisation Africaine de la Propriete Intellectuelle (OAPI), a grouping of twelve former 
French colonies in West Africa, has fully harmonized the substantive patent law applicable within its 
member states. By contrast, the European Patent Convention (EPO) and African Regional Intellectual 
Property Organization's (ARIPO) Lusaka Agreement only governs pre-grant proceedings. Gerald 
Mossinghoff & Vivian Ku, World Patent System Circa 20XX, A.D., 38 IDEA 529, 542-45 (1998). 
ARIPO is OAPI's equivalent for English-speaking African nations. The European Patent Office (EPO) 
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extent to which centralized examinations have displaced national 
review. 107 Organisation Africaine de la Propriete Intellectuelle 
(OAPD vests exclusive jurisdiction of patentability determinations in 
its central administering body, whereas the European Patent Office 
(EPO) and Eurasian Patent Convention I os operate as an alternative to 
national patenting procedures. 109 
A regional model is flexible enough to be adapted to many 
different contexts and institutional frameworks and thus could appeal 
under any of the strategic profiles identified above. Passive 
minimalists will appreciate the potential to share administrative costs 
with neighboring states. Affording indigenous inventors access to a 
broader market base will appeal to Nativists, while Globalists may 
see regional patent rights as serving to lure foreign companies. This 
latter prospect can be welcome if it brings investment, but perhaps 
harmful if it merely encourages foreign rights-holders to file for 
patents and extract monopoly rents from afar. There are numerous 
institutional I 10 and possibly legal I II challenges inherent in operating a 
is the agency established under the aegis of the European Patent Organization, a grouping of thirty-two 
countries which include all twenty-seven member states of the European Union plus five others and 
which administers the European Patent Convention (EPC). 
107. See Mossinghoff & Ku, supra note 106, at 541-46. In each of these organizations, post-grant 
interpretation and enforcement of the patents has remained subject to national law. In theory, however, 
centralized enforcement mechanisms could be also established as well, enabling cost sharing in this 
respect as well. Indeed, the European Union had taken tentative steps in this direction via its Brussels 
Convention until the European Court of Justice ruled against it. See Case C-4/03, Gesellschaft flir 
Antriebstechnik mbH & Co. KG v. Lamellen und Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs KG, http://eur-
lex.europa.euiLexUriServlLexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62003J0004:EN:HTML (July 13,2006); Case C-
539/03, Roche Nederland BV v. Primus, http://eur-
lex.europa.euiLexUriServlLexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62003J0539:EN :HTML (July 13, 2006); 
Mossinghoff & Ku, supra note 106, at 539-540. 
lOS. The Eurasian Patent Convention (EAPC) groups together now-independent states that were 
formerly republics of the Soviet Union. Mossinghoff & Ku, supra note 106, at 545. 
109. Id. at 542-545. ARIPO follows a hybrid model whereby centralized examinations govern the 
issuance of patents unless members opt out on a case-by-case basis, by notifying their intent to deny 
recognition to specific patents within their territory. Id. at 545. Yet, another model can be seen in the 
cooperation among Andean countries with respect the International Convention for the Protection of 
New Varieties of Plants (upOV) whereby different countries specialize in examinations of different 
varietals. Sherwood, supra note I, at 521. 
110. These include difficulties in agreeing on governance, funding mechanisms, legal standards, 
institutional locations, official language(s), etc. A threshold level of comfort and trust between the 
prospective partners is essential to maintain political cooperation despite sources of friction that may 
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supranational institution that need to reckoned with. The main 
problem with regional organizations, however, is that even by 
combining efforts, developing countries may lack the ability to 
effectively conduct patent examinations for truly state-of-the-art 
technologies. 112 Therefore, such organizations may need recourse to 
external assistance in at least some cases. 
b. Patent Cooperation Treaty 
Another way to outsource patent examinations is for developing 
countries to join the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT). The PCT is 
designed to streamline international patent applications, allowing 
inventors to apply for global patent rights through a single 
streamlined process. As part of the initial "international phase" of the 
PCT process, an international search report and preliminary 
examination opinion are prepared by expert staff at some of the 
world's leading patent offices, based on an in-depth search for and 
analysis of prior art. These patentability assessments are not binding, 
but may be relied on by national patent offices during the subsequent 
"national phase" in which applicants prosecute their claims on a 
country-by-country basis. 
The advantage of relying on PCT preliminary examination reports 
to determine whether to award a national patent (as opposed to 
arise over the long-tenn. Political stability can also be a concern. For example, Zimbabwe, the 
headquarters of ARIPO, is currently beset by political and macroeconomic tunnoil. 
III. In principle, MFN objections similar to the patent re-registration example discussed below could 
arise in a regional context with respect to procedural advantages offered to regional participants vis-ii-vis 
outsiders. For example, the EPC gives preferential treatment to applications filed in languages of its 
member states vs. foreign languages. Mossinghoff & Ku, supra note 106, at 542. While this linguistic 
preference may be grandfathered under TRIPS Article 4(d), comparable provisions adopted today would 
not be. See UNCTAD RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 82, at 20-21; Hanns Ullrich, TRIPS: Adequate 
Protection, Inadequate Trade. Adequate Competition Policy, 4 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'y J. 153, 184 n.133 
(1995). If pressed, however, a WTO panel would likely find regional cooperation to be a sufficiently 
compelling objective to justify any such de facto inequalities of treatment. Given the strong public 
policy endorsement that regional patent organizations received in the Doha Decision, plus the precedents 
established by the EPO and other such bodies, it would take unusual circumstances to overcome such 
presumptions of legitimacy. As noted above, the existence of a free trade agreement could also provide a 
possible defense to an MFN challenge. See supra note 82. 
112. Sherwood, supra note I, at 528. 
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relying on foreign patent proxies under a re-registration scheme) is 
that developing countries are assured access to the underlying 
analysis on which the patentability was determined as well as the 
relevant body of prior art that was considered. 1 13 This allows them to 
maintain some control over substantive standards and (at least in 
theory) depart from the international recommendations in appropriate 
cases. A drawback of PCT examinations in that there is no provision 
for reexamination following an amendment of claims or subsequent 
discovery of prior art. Since the PCT requires that applicants be 
given the opportunity to amend, the former omission, in particular, 
makes reliance on PCT examinations an incomplete solution. 1 14 
The PCT offers perhaps the greatest appeal to developing countries 
embracing a Globalist strategy. Participation in the PCT arguably 
promotes technology transfer by enabling foreign investors more 
efficient access to the national patent system. It also makes it easier 
for indigenous inventors to procure global protection for their 
innovations, and, for the same reason, may encourage foreign 
companies to invest in research and development through local 
subsidiaries. As an added bonus, the PCT discounts its fees for non-
corporate applicants from qualifying developing countries. 1 15 
Most home-grown technologies produced by developed countries, 
however, are not patented overseas: 116 95.5% of all PCT applications 
come from nationals of OECD member countries. 117 Undoubtedly, 
there is untapped potential that should not be discounted. II8 At 
113. While national patents offices typically make available the pre-grant "file wrapper" of 
correspondence between the examiner and applicant that may shed insight on key issues of patentability, 
this record does not record internal deliberations within the patent office. 
114. NOLFF, supra note 25, at 156 (quoting PCT Article 28/41). 
115. Natural (i.e. non-corporate) applicants from countries with annual GDP per capita below $3,000 
receive a 75% discount. Unfortunately, the discount only applies to fees during the "international phase" 
of the PCT process. Applicants must pay full price during the subsequent "national" phase in which they 
must perfect their patent claims in countries of their choice. NOLFF, supra note 25, at 147. 
116. WlPO statistics on the top twenty countries ranked by worldwide non-resident patent filings in 
2006 include only two developing countries-China and India-ranked at #17 and #20, respectively. 
117. Lehman, supra note 49, at 425. Lehman adds that "if you include China and Israel into the mix it 
goes up to over 99%." Id 
118. Sherwood, supra note I; Lehman, supra note 49, at 426 (describing patentable technologies 
produced by Jamaican university). 
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present, however, most innovators in developing countries lack the 
means to patent overseas; by itself, the peT will do nothing to 
change that. 119 
Instead, the immediate benefits of peT participation are likely to 
redound to foreigner inventors. Joining the peT greatly reduces the 
transactional costs for foreigners to obtain patent rights in developing 
countries. "The peT was designed to be as applicant-friendly as 
possible.,,120 It removes much of the guesswork involved in securing 
global patent rights by harmonizing procedures and eliminating or 
minimizing procedural obstacles that often deter foreign applicants 
such as translation requirements, use of specialized forms, mandatory 
disclosures, etc., while providing a one-stop-shop for securing global 
priority. 121 As a result, the share of international patents processed 
through the peT has grown steadily in recent decades. 
Joining the peT is therefore likely to mean significantly more 
foreign patent applications. While increased foreign patent activity 
can generate additional revenue from patent fees, it comes at a cost. 
For countries seeking to minimize the economic drain of patent 
royalties to overseas rights-holders, peT participation can pose a 
significant disadvantage. Moreover, the peT enables inventors to 
hedge their bets by allowing a thirty month delay after their initial 
filing before entering national phase,122 giving applicants time to 
assess the value and marketability of their inventions before investing 
in widespread patent procurement. This inventor-friendly rule means 
that the patents that do go forward are likely to be of higher value 
than if the applicants had to make such decisions up front, 
compounding the potential economic losses to foreign patentees. 
119. Lehman, supra note 49, at 426 (advocating a global funding mechanism to enable developing 
countries meaningful access to the patent systems in developed countries). The ability to patent overseas 
is only one hurdle that inventors in developing countries must overcome to launch their technologies on 
the global marketplace. They also need access to venture capital, marketing, distribution channels, etc. 
120. NOLFF, supra note 25, at 85 
121. Markus Nolff, The Expanded International Search Procedure: What Will Be the Next Step in 
View o/TRIPS?, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'y 717 (2004). 
122. Id. at 720. 
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Finally, while the peT's preliminary opinions can significantly 
reduce examination costs, relying on peT process as the exclusive 
basis for patentability decisions may disadvantage indigenous 
inventors who are only looking for patent protection in their home 
market by forcing them to assume added costs of a peT application. 
For many developing countries, the costs of the peT may thus exceed 
the benefits. 123 
c. WIPO's Patent Information Services (WPIS) 
As an alternative to peT examination reports, WIPO offers a 
separate patent consulting service exclusively for developing 
countries. Developing countries can obtain search reports and 
patentability opinions prepared free of charge by participating 
developed country patent offices. The opinions only address novelty 
and non-obviousness, leaving developing countries to assess subject-
matter, utility, and enablement requirements on their own.124 
However, several European patent offices provide additional 
consulting services to developing countries by special arrangement. 
The advantage of going this route is that it avoids the added exposure 
to foreign patenting that participating in the peT entails. 125 And for 
developing countries that do participate in the peT, WPIS reports can 
be used to process patent applications from local inventors who do 
not want to be burdened with going through the peT. 
123. It is worth noting that developing countries might be able to gain access to peT preliminary 
examination reports even without formally participating in the treaty simply by requiring inventors to 
disclose such reports, where available, when applying for a national patent. TRIPS' Article 29 explicitly 
permits member states to "require an applicant for a patent to provide information concerning the 
applicant's corresponding foreign applications and grants." Whether such free riding will win them any 
friends is another matter. 
124. Of special interest to Nativists, WPIS will also prepare reports on the overall "state-of-the-art" in 
a particular technical field upon request. Such reports can assist research and development efforts 
independent of patentability issues by allowing individuals or institutions in developing countries to 
keep abreast of global advances in technology. 
125. Lesser, supra note 52. 
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4. Hybrid Solutions 
Developing countries should consider mixing and matching several 
of the approaches described above. Countries can be selective as to 
the extent they perform in-house examinations, e.g., relying on 
external determinations of novelty and nonobviousness, while 
enforcing specific subject matter restrictions internally. For example, 
India has a specific rule limiting patents on derivatives of known 
substances designed to prevent "evergreening" of pharmaceutical 
patents. 126 Enforcing such restrictions can narrow the categories of 
eligible patents without requiring full-blown examinations. Some 
subject-matter restrictions--e.g., bars on software patents-are 
notoriously hard to define and subject to evasion through creative 
claims drafting. To guard against such "gaming" of subject matter 
rules, developing countries should consider comparing ambiguous 
applications against patents granted on the same underlying 
technologies elsewhere. To do this, they can take advantage of 
additional (free) services provided by WPIS to trace the lineage of 
"patent families" across multiple jurisdictions and provide copies of 
the relevant documents. A country might also accord presumptive 
deference to external determinations of validity while reserving the 
right to exercise independent review. 127 This might enable narrowing 
of standards in specific contexts that can be identified relatively 
easily. 
126. Under this statutory exclusion, "a new form of a known substance" is not patentable subject-
matter unless it results in significantly enhanced efficacy as compared to the original. Janice M. Mueller, 
The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India's Patent System and the Rise of Indian 
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. Pm. L. REv. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 71-72) (quoting 
Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act, 1970 (2005», available at http://ssm.comlabstract=923538. New 
uses of known substances must also result "in a new product or employ[ 1 at least one new reactant." Id. 
Many developing countries similarly bar patents on isolates of "biological materials found in nature." 
Correa, supra note 12, at n.109 (citing example of Brazil). Cf Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 
189 F. 95,103 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (opposite rule in U.S.). 
127. Several countries operate "modified substantive examination" procedures whereby the results 
from prior patent examinations in other countries are taken into consideration as part of the review 
process. See Asami, supra note 74 (citing Australia, Croatia, Singapore, and Malaysia as examples). 
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5. Deferred Examination 
Many developing countries require patent applicants to petition for 
substantive patentability review as a separate step that occurs after 
they have filed the initial application. Applicants may be allowed to 
wait as much as seven years before having their claims examined. 
They may also be granted provisional patent rights in the interim. 
Deferred examinations benefit inventors by allowing them to test the 
waters for their invention in the marketplace before having to incur 
the full expenses of prosecuting their claims to conclusion. As many 
initially filed applications do not proceed to the examination stage, 
the delays also benefit patent offices who are relieved of the burden 
and expense of conducting the examinations. Deferred examinations 
thus offer some of the cost-savings of registration systems, without 
entirely foregoing the quality control assurance of substantive 
examinations. 
As an inventor-friendly procedure, deferred examinations will 
appeal to Globalists and, to a lesser extent, Nativists. However, for 
patent skeptics, the cost savings they provide may prove illusory. The 
savings from filed, but never examined applications have to be 
balanced against applications that might never be filed at all under 
the pressure of an earlier deadline. Moreover, as was the case with 
the PCT's thirty-month delay, allowing inventors to wait will also 
result in more valuable patents being obtained, meaning greater 
royalty drains to foreigners. Especially for developing countries that 
opt out of the PCT, it may make sense to force the hands of 
prospective applicants. By obliging inventors to prosecute their 
claims separately, ahead of the global curve, such countries may 
impel the former to forgo their rights, keeping the underlying 
technology in the public domain. 
6. Additional Validity Checks 
In addition to the examination options discussed above, many 
developing countries rely on third party oppositions to prompt further 
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reexamination of patentability either pre- or post-grant. 128 Such 
proceedings can provide a quality control safeguard, and, for patent 
skeptics, can act as a further deterrent to prospective applicants. 129 
Publication of patent applications is the standard means to notify 
potential opposers, a practice that web technologies can greatly 
facilitate. 130 Instituting a practice of publishing preliminary opinions 
and search reports would provide a useful complement that would 
enable third parties to make better informed assessments of probable 
validity, whether or not oppositions are actually filed. Moreover, 
developing countries might solicit public input even without 
oppositions by emulating the "open source" patent wiki recently 
proposed by the USPTO. 131 
A bigger problem, however, is that many developing countries lack 
local competitors and/or public interest watchdogs who have an 
interest in challenging improperly issued patents. In many cases, 
patents will be obtained by foreign rights-holders solely to deter other 
foreign competitors from entering the market. As such, the patent 
may never actually be enforced, further limiting the opportunity to 
litigate its validity. This raises the danger that patents that may have 
been invalidated in the inventor's home country can live on 
indefinitely overseas, thanks to Paris Convention's principle of 
independent rightS. 132 Nor is there any international mechanism for 
128. The trend in developed countries has been to move away from pre-grant oppositions in favor of 
post-grant review due to a combination of pressure to harmonize procedures and a desire to eliminate 
prosecutorial delays. Nancy 1. Linck, Kevin T. Kramer & David J. Ball, Jr., A New Patent Examination 
System for the New Millennium, 35 Hous. L. REv. 305 (1998). Developing countries may take a 
different view, at least where patent skeptics are concerned. For them, delays and procedural 
idiosyncrasies could serve as useful deterrents. 
129. Opposition proceedings will appeal more readily to Substantive Minimalists than Passive 
Resisters because they require significant administrative investment. Countries relying on a patent re-
registration model, for example, are unlikely to have the technical capacity to conduct reexaminations 
(although they could potentially outsource the work). 
130. Many patent statutes only require publication in local newspaper. Posting on the web makes the 
information more widely accessible as well as searchable. 
131. Alan Sipress, Open Callfrom the Patent Office, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2007, at AI. If they prove 
viable, such systems could invite global commentary from NGOs, public interest watchdogs, and 
members of the scientific community. Soliciting input from a broader audience could prove particularly 
useful for developing countries that may not be able to rely on local competitors to lead oppositions. 
132. See Paris Convention, supra note 78, art. 4bis. 
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alerting developing countries to the fate of corresponding patents 
comparable to the Madrid Union's "central attack" procedure for 
trademarks. 133 As noted, WPIS does offer developing countries a free 
service to track "patent families" of related applications filed in 
multiple jurisdictions. Equipped with such information, a developing 
country could undertake to monitor such "families" for subsequent 
invalidations. However, to do so would be administratively 
cumbersome. A simpler solution might to require patent-holders to 
affirmatively disclose any adverse validity determinations with 
respect to comparable patents as part of their patent maintenance 
requirements. 134 Such disclosures could then trigger post-grant 
reexamination. 
B. Fees 
1. Timing/Distribution 
Developing countries should also give careful thought to the 
structure of the patent fees they assess. First, a decision must be 
reached as to the distribution of fees between the acquisition and 
maintenance phases of a patent grant. 135 In general, back-loaded fees 
are considered more inventor-friendly, allowing applicants time to 
evaluate the market potential of a new technology before they have to 
133. Cj Madrid Agreement Concerning International Registration of Marks, art. 6(3)-(4), Apr. 14, 
1891, as amended at Stockholm on July 14, 1967,828 V.N.T.S. 389 (requiring notification of trademark 
invalidity in country of origin leading to cancellation internationally). 
134. Article 29 of TRIPS explicitly permits member states to "require an applicant for a patent to 
provide information concerning the applicant's corresponding foreign applications and grants." Firms 
that hold mUltiple patents covering different aspects of the same underlying technology might object to 
such reporting requirements as overly burdensome. A precise definition of "corresponding" grants 
would need to be supplied. At minimum, however, where the local patent has been issued on the basis of 
a specific foreign patent grant, the reporting duty would encompass any adverse decisions with respect 
to the original foreign patent. 
135. Further variations are possible as to the distribution offees within these categories. For example, 
some countries charge separate fees for the initial filing vs. examination phase; some charge per claim, 
or per page, etc. Some countries assess maintenance fees annually; others (e.g., the V.S.) require 
payments only at designated intervals. Some have fixed maintenance fees throughout the patent. Others 
charge fees at incrementally increasingly levels. However, such fme tuning lies beyond the scope of this 
Article. For discussion of an optimal allocation of maintenance fees see Sherwood, supra note I. 
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invest significant sums in acquiring/maintaining patent rights. This 
approach may appeal especially to Nativists because inventors in 
developing countries often lack ready access to venture capital to 
bring products to market. By contrast, front-loaded fees can act as a 
deterrent to patenting, appealing to skeptics. However, keeping a 
residual level of maintenance fees assessed throughout the patent's 
life is probably worthwhile, even for skeptics, because such fees act 
as a de facto, self-executing working requirement that weeds out non-
productive patents. 136 Interestingly, an empirical survey by the 
present author suggests that most developing countries have opted for 
heavily back-loaded fees that increase incrementally over the life of 
the patent,137 apparently opting for an inventor-friendly structure, 
even at the risk of encouraging foreign patent claims. 138 
2. Amount 
Apart from the distribution of fees, a decision also needs to be 
reached as to how much to chargeY9 As noted, setting fees at a high 
level will deter some prospective applicants and while generating 
additional revenue from the rest. 140 A country that focused on 
maximizing revenues would base fees levels on supply and demand, 
which can be calculated according to standard principles of 
microeconomics. However, Substantive Minimalists emphasizing 
136. See id. 
137. The survey examined the patent fee structures of twenty developing countries whose patent 
offices post fee information online. It revealed that all but three backload fees. See Table on Patent Fees 
Imposed by Selected Developing Countries, Appendix. 
138. Back-loading fees also risks forfeiting potential revenue from patents not renewed for the full 
term. See Linck et aI., supra note 128, at 315 (noting that only one-third of patents issued in the U.S. are 
maintained through the third maintenance fees at eleven-and-a-half years). On the other hand, patents 
obtained in developing countries likely represent a self-selected subset of the most valuable technologies 
in order to justify global protection. If so, these patents-and pharmaceutical patents in particular-are 
more likely to be maintained for their full term. 
139. For simplicity, I will henceforth consider fees in terms of the total lifetime costs associated with 
the patent, i.e., combining both filing and maintenance fees. 
140. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-910, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: EXPERTS' ADVICE FOR 
SMALL BUSINESSES SEEKING FOREIGN PATENTS 25-28, 39 ( 2003) available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.itemsld03910.pdf [hereinafter GAO STUDY] (showing that price is an 
important factor governing foreign patenting decisions). 
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deterrence as part of their overall damage control strategy will want 
to push fees as high as possible.141 The question then becomes what 
might "as high as possible" mean. 
Neither TRIPS nor the peT specify an explicit upper bound on 
patent fees. TRIPS Article 62(1) only requires that "procedures and 
formalities" related to the acquisition or maintenance of intellectual 
property rights be "reasonable.,,142 Article 62(4) further stipulates that 
such procedures "shall be governed by the general principles set out 
in paragraph 2 and 3 of Article 41.,,143 These principles include the 
requirement that procedures be "fair and equitable" and not 
"unnecessarily ... costly."I44 While none of these terms are defined 
or elaborated upon, they could impose additional restraints beyond 
the threshold requirement of "reasonableness." In particular, the 
reference to "unnecessary" costs might be read as akin to the "not 
more trade-restrictive than necessary" test applied in other WTO 
contexts such as health and safety regulations. 145 The latter standard 
would be significantly more restrictive than one of mere 
"reasonableness. " 
Notably, however, Article 62(4) does not impose these same 
requirements on "formalities." Given the hypertextualist approach to 
treaty interpretation that pervades WTO interpretation, this 
distinction between formalities and procedures might be significant. 
WTO panels strive to give each and every term used in a treaty text a 
distinct meaning. The repetition of "procedures" in both paragraphs 
of Article 62, juxtaposed with the omission of "formalities" in the 
second instance, could be taken to mean that only the former are 
subject to the additional restriction. Since patent fees fall more 
141. Using fees as a deterrent would also be consistent with a Passive Resister strategy since 
collecting patent fees does not require much administrative effort and provides a cost-free method of 
resistance. 
142. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 62(1). Moreover, maximizing fee revenues might prove an 
illusory gain when the full costs of patent protection are considered. 
143. Id. art. 62(4). 
144. Id. art. 41(2). 
145. See, e.g., Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, art. 5(6), Apr. 
15,1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, 1867 U.N.T.S. 
493 331.L.M. 1144 (1994), available al http://www.wto.org/english/docs_eIlegal_elI5-sps.pdf. 
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naturally within the plain meaning of the "formalities" than 
"procedures,,,146 the omission of formalities from Article 62(4) 
suggests that patent fees are subject only to "reasonableness." 
Regardless of which textual formula is deemed controlling, it 
remains to be seen how they would be evaluated in practice. 
"Reasonableness," "unnecessary costliness," and "fairness and 
equity" all denote fairly abstract concepts with overlapping 
meanings. Because such terms are left undefined by TRIPS, member 
states would appear to have considerable discretion to reach their 
own interpretations. In the absence of further guidance, a WTO panel 
would likely accord considerable deference to their sovereign 
choices. 147 However, if forced to decide the outer bounds of 
reasonableness within which such member state discretion must be 
exercised, the panel would likely consider a broadly similar set of 
criteria under any of these phrases. Patent fees can be analogized to 
the rent on a lease-i.e., a purchase of a temporary property right. 148 
To determine if the rent is "fair" or "reasonable" one might: (1) look 
at comparable rentals; (2) consider the value received (e.g., square 
footage, fixtures, conveniences); (3) calculate the landlord's costs 
(e.g., purchase price and maintenance); (4) assess the tenant's ability 
146. Black's Law Dictionary defines "fonnality" as follows: 
1. A small point of practice that, though seemingly unimportant, must usu. be observed 
to achieve a particular legal result ... 3. Copyright. (usu. pI.) A procedural requirement 
fonnerly required before receiving U.S. copyright protection .• Fonnalities included (1) a 
copyright notice appearing on the work, (2) actual publication, (3) registration with the 
Copyright Office, and (4) deposit of the work with the Library of Congress. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 678 (8th ed. 2004). Patent fees are directly analogous to the copyright 
fonnalities described in the second definition quoted above in that they are fonnal prerequisite act to 
obtain the grant of an IP right. By contrast, law.com ascribes to "procedure" a more general meaning of 
"the methods and mechanics of the legal process. These include filing complaints, answers and 
demurrers; serving documents on the opposition; setting hearings, depositions, motions, petitions, 
interrogatories; preparing orders; giving notice to the other parties; conduct of trials; and all the rules 
and laws governing that process." Furthennore, TRIPS Article 62(4) itself contextualizes the meaning of 
"procedures" by referring in particular to "administrative revocation and inter partes procedures such as 
opposition, revocation and canceUation," which fit with this more generic understanding of procedure as 
elements of legal process rather than a specific prerequisite act to obtain a property right. 
147. See generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. I ("Members shall be free to detennine the 
appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and 
practice. "). 
148. One might further analogize acquisition fees to up-front "move-in costs" and maintenance fees to 
the monthly rental payments. 
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to pay; or (5) incorporate broader public policy perspectives (e.g., 
social justice concerns, rent control, urban planning). 
A WTO panel could pursue analogous approaches in scrutinizing 
patent fees. 149 First, to examine "comparables," a panel is likely to 
look to existing state practice. I 50 So long as a developing country 
keeps its fees roughly in line with other member states, they are 
likely to be upheld as "reasonable." The lifetime cost of acquiring 
and maintaining a patent varies considerably. For patents issued in 
the U.S., Germany, and Japan they range from roughly $15,000 to 
$30,000. 151 Such fee comparisons would likely provide the strongest 
determinant of "reasonableness." By this standard, most developing 
countries charge much less than they theoretically could: a survey by 
the present author of twenty developing countries found lifetime 
patent fee costs ranging from $375 in Nepal to $21,500 in Barbados 
(the next highest was Belize at $10,124), with an average of 
$5,846. 152 Patent skeptics among them could therefore consider 
substantially raising their fees. 
Prospective patentees might object, however, that patent rights in 
developing countries are worth less than rights in developed markets, 
thus demanding a lower ceiling on fees. The preamble to TRIPS 
"recogniz[es] that intellectual property rights are private rightS.,,153 
Arguably, reasonableness of fees could therefore be evaluated from 
149. To justify a given fee structure, a developing country would therefore want to be able to 
triangulate between each of separate rationales, in order to construct a multiple pronged defense tailored 
to their particular situation. 
150. Following the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, WTO panels look both at (a) state 
practice prior to TRIPS as establishing a baseline norm that may have informed the understanding of the 
drafters, and (b) subsequent state practice in implementing TRIPS' requirements, to the extent it reveals 
an international consensus as to the scope of specific obligations. See Canada Pharmaceuticals, supra 
note 91; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 3 I (3)(b), 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331 (1969). 
151. See GAO STUDY, supra note 140, at 4 I -52. 
152. See Table on Patent Fees Imposed by Selected Developing Countries, Appendix. 
153. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, pmbl., recital 4. The significance of this language is contested. 
Accounts of TRIPS' legislative history suggest that the reference to "private rights" was inserted only to 
emphasize that governments would not be directly responsible for prosecuting infringements. See 
UNCT AD REsOURCE BOOK, supra note 83, at I I, n.2 I. If so, it is unlikely to be read as bolstering IP 
rights. 
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the applicant's perspective in terms of value received. IS4 The 
economic value of a patent right can be quantified in market terms, I 55 
and, in practice, patent holders do weigh such cost-benefit analyses 
when making foreign patenting decisions. 156 A small, poor country 
that charged disproportionately high fees would arguably upset this 
implicit fee-to-value balancing principle. 157 Indeed, taken to an 
extreme, adopting fee levels that forced patent applicants to purchase 
their monopoly rights at their full market value would nullify the 
benefit of having a patent and destroy the underlying incentive to 
innovate. 158 Furthermore, the value of such rights will vary 
according to the individual patent which could, in theory, dictate 
different upper bounds in different cases. In practice, however, an 
individualized approach to fee levels would prove unmanageable. 159 
Despite WTO precedent considering limitations on patent rights on a 
case-by-case basis in an Article 30 context,160 a panel assessing fee-
to-value proportionality would almost certainly apply this test to 
average patent values viewed in aggregate. 
154. Cf Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 4 (arguing for "reliance" interests to be judged from 
private rights-holder perspective when interpreting TRIPS in a different context (non-violation 
nullification and impairment». 
155. Economists could calculate the value of such monopoly rights directly. They can also look to 
licensing agreements for a market-determined price. There are other strategic benefits to patenting 
beyond the market value of the rights--e.g., helping to secure financing or deter competitors. However, 
market value should serve as a useful first approximation. 
156. E.g., when considering market size vs. fees. 
157. In this context, a panel might also look to TRIPS Article 7, which calls for the protection of IP 
rights to "contribute to ... a balance of rights and obligations." Since Article 7 sets out the objectives of 
TRIPS, its focus on balancing rights and obligations would likely inform the textual references to "fair 
and equitable" and "reasonable" procedures in Articles 41 and 62. See Vienna Convention, supra note 
150, art. 31(1) (treaty language should be construed according to the treaty's goals). 
158. Such nullification would go against Article 7, which posits "the promotion of technological 
innovation" as one of the goals ofIP protection. 
159. A patent office cannot reasonably predict the value of prospective patent applications. Indeed, 
many patents tum out to be entirely worthless (aside perhaps from ego gratification for the inventor), 
which would mean, as to these patents, any fees whatsoever would have to be deemed disproportionate. 
Nor can a patent office discriminate by technology without violating TRIPS Article 27. Unsurprisingly, 
established state practice is to have uniform fee levels, with the only variation being based on applicant 
entity size. See infra note 182-85 and accompanying text 
160. Cf Canada Pharmaceuticals, supra note 91, at ~ 7.37 (stating that "[e]ach exception must be 
evaluated with regard to its impact on each affected patent, independently"). Article 30 allows 
derogations from TRIPS' patent mandate to the extent they fall within its "limited exception" 
requirements. 
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In any event, developing countries should not concede the 
applicant's "fee value" perspective as the arbiter of fee 
reasonableness. Instead, they could justify higher fees as necessary to 
recover the underlying expenses of their patent system (i.e., the 
"landlord cost" perspective). The textual injunction against 
"unnecessary costliness" in Article 62(4)/Article 41, in particular, 
strongly suggests such a basis for appraising fees. ''Necessary'' costs 
would certainly include staff time and administrative costs to process 
a patent application. 161 Additional pro rata allocations might be made 
to cover the fixed costs of operating a patent office. 162 More 
creatively, commentators have suggested that a country could tack on 
additional amounts to pay for enforcement of patent rights, including 
judicial time spent on patent disputes and border control mechanisms 
to impound infringing imports. 163 Perhaps even the initial start-up 
costs in establishing a patent system and training staff could be 
recovered as a component of fees amortized over a chosen time 
period. l64 Assuming a panel were willing to indulge such expansive 
accounting, applicants could be forced to fully internalize a "fair and 
equitable" share of the administrative costs associated with their 
patent grant. 165 
At some point, however, a panel is likely to draw the line at 
attempts to force patent holders to pay for overly ambitious or 
extravagant investments in governance. 166 Conversely, a cost 
161. Note that countries that perform patent examinations "in house" will be in the stronger position 
to justifY high fees under such a cost recovery approach. 
162. Patent fees can contribute to building technical and administrative capacity, which in tum serve 
to justifY higher fees. 
163. Heald, supra note 23, at 284. Maintenance fees could be conceptualized as corresponding to 
enforcement costs, with acquisition fees linked to examination costs. However, one doubts whether a 
WTO panel would insist on such linkages, without a textual basis to do in TRIPS. 
164. Cj Maskus, supra note I I, at 494 (detailing start-up costs). 
165. Cj Reichman & Lange, supra note 40 (suggesting such a fee-for-service approach be 
implemented on a case-by-case basis). 
166. TRIPS Article 67 would likely figure in this debate. Article 67 commits developed country 
members to provide technical and fmancial assistance to help developing countries establish and enforce 
systems for IP right protection. This could cut two ways. One could read this as evincing a general 
policy commitment to easing the burdens borne by developing countries, which would support an 
analogous position on fees. Or one could view Article 67 as embodying a commitment exclusively by 
governments to provide the needed assistance, thus obviating the need for private firms to contribute and 
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recovery model might not stand as the ceiling on fees charged by 
lower-cost patent operations either. Traditionally, many countries 
have operated patent and trademark offices as profit centers, with 
revenues greatly exceeding costS.1 67 Such well-established state 
practice suggests that-to the extent "unnecessary costliness" does 
apply to fees-it was not intended to be judged solely on the basis of 
input costs. Indeed, when WTO treaty drafters have intended to 
impose such a concrete limitation, they have elsewhere been explicit 
in saying SO.168 Patent fees arguably serve a broader function than 
merely defraying expenses. They represent an important policy lever 
regulating the dispensation of monopoly rights and ensuring that such 
rights are put to productive economic use. 169 The "necessity" of a 
given fee level might also be viewed on this broader, normative 
dimension. 170 
Developing countries could also advance arguments based on 
social justice rationales as an implicit counter to "fee balancing" from 
the rights-holder perspective. Although TRIPS' preamble 
acknowledges that IP rights are "private," it "recogniz[es] the 
underlying public policy objectives of national systems for the 
protection of intellectual property, including developmental and 
technological objectives. ,,171 Such a broader policy perspectives are 
echoed in Article 7 which posits the objectives of TRIPS as including 
perhaps preventing such an obligation from being unilaterally imposed. See TRIPS Agreement, supra 
note 2, art. 67 (referring to cooperation "on mutually agreed terms and conditions") (emphasis added). 
167. Lesser, supra note 52, ch. 7. The U.S. government, for example, diverts about \0% of PTO fees 
annually to the general treasury. Note, however, an expansive "full internalization" approach including 
enforcement costs (assuming a panel were willing to countenance it) would yield significantly higher 
expenses calculations than are reflected in such profitability accounting. If so, a cost recovery rationale 
might still present the strongest basis to justify high fees. 
168. See GATT, supra note 82, art. VIII(I)(a) ("All fees and charges ... shall be limited in amount to 
the approximate cost of services rendered and shall not represent ... a taxation ... for fiscal purposes. "). 
GATT was the multilaterally trade agreement that preceded the WTO and was incorporated by the latter. 
Because TRIPS was adopted as an annex to the same WTO Agreement that incorporate GATT, a WTO 
panels is likely to read the two texts in pari materia. 
169. See Sherwood, supra note I (on maintenance fees serving as the functional equivalent of a 
"working requirement."). 
170. Cf Canada Pharmaceuticals, supra note 91 (construing patent language in TRIPS as embodying 
a dual-standard, both an empirical and normative). 
171. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, pmbl" recital 5. Cf Vienna Convention, supra note 150, art. 
31(2) (stipulating that relevant context for treaty interpretation includes preamble as well as text). 
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"the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual 
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in 
a manner conducive to social and economic weljare."I72 One could 
argue that high fees serve these objectives. Fees serve as a deterrent 
to patenting, thereby facilitating the transfer and dissemination of 
unpatented technologies. 173 Patent fees can also be used to build 
technical capacity and improve governance, contributing to the 
"mutual advantage" of producers and users contemplated by Article 
7. Forcing patent holders to partly compensate for the dead weight 
losses that their monopoly rights create arguably ensures a "balance 
of rights and obligations." Moreover, minimizing the drain of 
royalties from poor countries to rich ones could be consistent with a 
global reckoning of "social and economic we1fare.,,174 Therefore, 
developing countries can plausibly make the case that to be "fair and 
equitable," fees should be evaluated against this broader social justice 
backdrop and in tandem with other TRIPSIWTO provisions evincing 
special concern for developing nations. 175 As poor, underdeveloped, 
net importers of intellectual property, developing countries could 
conceivably be entitled to impose higher fees than rich countries in 
order to shift some of the economic burdens of global IP protection 
172. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 7 (emphasis added). As noted, under the Vienna 
Convention on treaty interpretation, TRIPS' "objectives" set out in Article 7 would inform a reading of 
Articles 41 and 62. See supra note 157. 
173. One could counter that high fees will inhibit transfer of proprietary technologies. However, 
foreign companies investing directly in local production are much less likely to be deterred by an 
increase in patent fees (which would represent a small fraction of their total investment) as compared to 
absentee rights-holders looking to maximize their marginal gains of global rent extraction, balanced 
against the incremental costs of worldwide patent procurement. 
174. See John H. Barton, Issues Posed by a World Patent System, 7 J.INT'L ECON. L. 341, 345 (2004) 
(describing the "inequitable allocation of the cost of research" born by the developing world). 
175. Reichman, supra note 50, at 40-41; Maggie Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development 
Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REv. 2821, 2905-06 (2006). TRIPS contains a number of provisions that 
acknowledge the "special needs" of developing and least developed countries. See TRIPS Agreement, 
supra note 2, pmbl., recitals 5 & 6, arts. 7, 8, 66-67. Moreover, TRIPS arguably should be read against 
the larger backdrop ofGATTIWTO treaty law which reinforces these pro-development values. See. e.g., 
WTO Agreement, supra note 28, pmbl., recital 2 (recognizing the "need for positive efforts" to benefit 
developing countries). Whether a TRIPS panel would be willing to imply a generalized "special and 
differential treatment" principle out of these combined provisions is open to debate. See Reichman, 
supra note 50, at 41-42 (arguing that "vestiges of [GATT's] 'two-tiered' regime have been incorporated 
into the TRIPS Agreement, in a kind of 'invisible ink' that will become more legible over time"). 
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from "producers" to "users" per Article 7's balancing of rights and 
obligations. 
That said, there are reasons independent of TRIPS' legal 
constraints for a country to exercise restraint in the fees it charges. 
First, some might worry that setting fees too high may deter foreign 
investors, although one may doubt whether patent fees play much of 
a role in investment decisions. I76 Second, relying on patent fees too 
heavily as a revenue source may lead to an unhealthy dependency 
and risks the institutional capture of patent offices by their 
multinational clients. I77 A further concem--of special interest to 
Nativists-is a risk that high patent fees will discourage indigenous 
inventors. I78 
3. Tiered Rates 
The obvious solution to this latter concem-charging lower prices 
for locals than foreigners-would run afoul of national treatment 
rules in both TRIPS and the Paris Convention that prevent countries 
from discriminating by nationality.I79 But could a country justify 
discriminating in favor of applicants from developing countries 
generally based on their reduced ability to pay?I80 One might read 
into the "fair and equitable" and "balancing of rights and obligations" 
language discussed above a concern over the applicants' ability to 
pay, introducing a kind of implicit means testing into assessments of 
fee "reasonableness"? As noted, the Patent Cooperation Treaty gives 
substantial discounts to applicants from developing countries. 
176. See supra text preceding note 55. 
177. See Reichman, supra note 50, at 29 (calling for states to "resist the temptation to treat intellectual 
property services as a 'cash cow,' which leads to the rubber-stamping of foreign applications"); PETER 
DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 
204-05 (2002) (relating anecdotal evidence of multinational companies exerting undue influence over 
newly-fledged patent offices). Sherwood also cautions that countries that treat patent offices as revenue 
sources for the general treasury often fail to reinvest adequately in patent administration. Sherwood, 
supra note I, at 523. 
178. Sherwood, supra note 1. 
179. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 3; Paris Convention, supra note 78, art. 2. 
180. Morocco appears to make such a distinction in charging reduced fees to applicants from 
countries in whose annual GDP per capita is less than US$3000. 
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However, such tiered pricing is not mirrored in member state practice 
at the national level. Moreover, preferential treatment of developing 
countries would likely violate TRIPS' MFN provision. 181 However 
desirable such tiered pricing might appear normatively, a WTO panel 
is thus unlikely to sanction it overtly under TRIPS. 
To get around this obstacle, some countries establish a tiered 
system of fees tied to entity status/size whereby individuals and/or 
small business applicants get a discount, while large multinational 
companies pay full price. 182 Indeed, such tiered pricing has long been 
practiced in the US, where it is justified as ensuring equal access for 
small inventors to protect their innovations. 183 For developing 
countries, however, the advantage of tiered pricing is that small 
entities will be primarily local and big ones overwhelmingly foreign, 
resulting in de facto price discrimination that can tax and deter 
foreign applicants through high prices without disadvantaging local 
ones. 
Given this disparity, it is perhaps surprising that more developing 
countries have not adopted tiered pricing. Of the twenty developing 
country patent offices surveyed, less than half (eight) presently offer 
some form of tiered fee pricing. Of these, most restrict the discounted 
rates to natural persons-meaning corporations based in developing 
countries would be ineligible. 184 Such restrictive criteria hamper the 
181. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 4. One might argue that "affmnative action" in favor of 
poor countries should not constitute discrimination. See Maggie Chon, supra note 175, at 2885 (arguing 
for a "substantive equality" principle in TRIPS that would display special concern for the needs of 
developing countries). However, unlike GAIT, which explicitly recognizes the need for preferential 
treatment of developing countries and has specifically waived MFN rules for this purpose, TRIPS has no 
comparable "special and differential treatment" principle. See GAIT, supra note 82, art. XXXVI; 
Reichman & Lange, supra note 40, at 40-41. WTO Panels thus far have proven unwilling to allow social 
policy rationales to override antidiscrimination norms. See Canada Pharmaceuticals, supra note 91, at 
'U7.92 (rejecting reliance on Art. 7 & 8 to evade TRIPS' bar on patent subject-matter discrimination in 
Article 27). 
182. Sherwood, supra note I; Lesser, supra note 52, ch. 7. 
183. See GAO STUDY, supra note 140, at 41. 
184. The Philippines and Brazil were the only countries surveyed that offer discounted fees to small 
businesses. The other countries limit fee reductions either to "natural persons" or else, even more 
restrictively, to the "original inventor." See Table 'on Patent Fees Imposed by Selected Developing 
Countries, Appendix. 
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ability of local entrepreneurs to commercialize indigenous innovation 
by raising capital through incorporation. 
One limitation is that indirect discrimination is still vulnerable to 
national treatment and/or MFN objections. Some degree of discounts 
for small businesses can probably be defended, per the U.S. example, 
as a legitimate practice that accords with TRIPS' broader purpose of 
encouraging innovation. 185 However, the more extreme the disparity, 
the more likely that a WTO panel would condemn the disparity as a 
mere pretext for nationality discrimination. 186 This places developing 
countries who want to use fees as a deterrent in a difficult position. 
To charge foreign multinationals fees close to the upper bound of 
"reasonableness," they may end up pricing out local inventors even 
after granting them the largest discount they could plausibly 
justify. 187 
4. Subsidizing Locals 
One way to avoid this dilemma is to rely on a subsidy scheme to 
offset some of the costs born by locals. WTO/GA IT rules on national 
treatment contain an exemption for subsidies to producers. 188 
However, TRIPS contains its own separate national treatment rule. 
Whether this exception has been implicitly incorporated into the 
latter is debatable. 189 Merely repacking discriminatory prices as a 
185. As noted, de facto discrimination is not actionable where a legitimate objective purpose can be 
shown. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
186. Cf Appellate Body Report, Chile-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, '1\ 52-53, WTIDS87/ABIR, 
WTIDSIIO/ABIR (Dec. 13, 1999) (adopted Jan. 12,2000) (extreme disparity in tax treatment structured 
so as to accord de facto preference to domestic alcohol constituted unlawful discrimination); Canada 
Pharmaceuticals, supra note 91, at '1\7.104-05 (de facto discrimination actionable where rationale for 
differentiating between patents amounts to sham). 
187. The relatively low fees charged even by developing countries with tiered rates suggests that 
countries are erring on the side of inclusiveness. Combined with back-loaded fee structures, the result is 
relatively inventor-friendly fee structure consistent with a Nativist or Globalist profile. One wonders, 
however, to what extent such policy choices may have been influenced by outside advice, e.g., 
''technical assistance" from rich countries leading developing nations to adopt policies that cut against 
their national interest. 
188. See GATT, supra note 82, art. IIl(8)(b). 
189. The TRIPS Agreement was adopted as an annex to the overall WTO acquis, and WTO panels 
traditionally have read such agreements in pari materia with the existing body of GATT rules. 
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"subsidy" would therefore be unwise. Instead, a developing country 
should implement a broader research subsidy program of which 
funding to secure IP rights locally and-just as importantly-
internationallyl90 would comprise but one component. 191 Such a 
subsidy program would be consistent with the broader vision of 
patent offices as catalysts for technology incubation described 
above. 192 
To be sure, subsidies are themselves subject to GATT discipline. 
Yet, unless they are made contingent on exports or the use of 
domestic content, such generalized assistance is likely not 
actionable. 193 The WTO subsidies code only governs benefits 
directed at specific industries. To justify a remedy, an aggrieved 
member state must demonstrate both that the subsidy is "specific" 
and that it has caused significant competitive harm to an identifiable 
industry of the complainant. Even assuming specificity could be 
established, most firms in developing countries do not actively 
compete in global markets and are thus unlikely to generate such 
competitive harms. It also may be difficult to establish a causal link 
between such generalized research subsidies and competitive 
advantage gained in the marketplace. Moreover, the subsidies code 
allows for fairly generous de minimis exceptions in the case of 
developing countries. 194 
See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Argentina-Safeguard Measure on Imports of Footwear, 
WTIDSI21/ABIR (Dec. 14, 1999) (adopted Jan. 12,2000). Such cases did so, however, in construing 
codes that elaborated upon and incorporated by reference specific GAlT provisions. While the TRIPS' 
preamble does refer generally to "recognizing the basic principles of GAlT 1994," its national treatment 
provision (Article 3) itself does not reference its GAlT counterpart, Article III. Instead, Article III 
references the national treatment provisions in preexisting international IP conventions such as the Paris 
and Berne Conventions, underlying the conceptual distinctions between IP and international trade that 
might make a panel might be less willing to draw interpretive link across these separate domains. 
190. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
191. To push the envelope a step further, a developing country might also allocate the costs of such 
research subsidies as part of the expense to be recaptured through patent fees, relying on an Article 7 
"mutual advantage" rationale to justifY such revenue redistributions. 
192. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text. 
193. So-called "red light" subsidies linked to exports or domestic content are per se invalid. See 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 3, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, 331.L.M. 1125 (1994). 
194. Id. art. 27.1 0-27.11. 
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5. Ancillary Service Charges 
Finally, it is worth noting that patent offices in Europe and 
elsewhere require use of (and charge separate fees for) local 
translators and patent agents, which can substantially increase the 
total costs of patenting, acting as a further deterrent to foreign 
applicants and a source of revenues for the local economy.195 To 
secure maximum protection, patents issued under the European 
Patent Convention must be translated into at least twenty-eight 
different languages, including such obscure tongues as Estonian and 
Irish (Gaelic).196 Developing countries-especially those with more 
than one official language-should consider adopting similar 
requirements to further boost the cost of patent applications. Such 
requirements will likely disadvantage foreign applicants more than 
locals, appealing to patent skeptics and Nativists. Yet, their well-
established precedent in state practice probably immunizes them from 
national treatment objections. 
C. Alternative Protection Models 
The desire to discriminate between foreign patents and indigenous 
innovation is not limited to fees. Nativists will be similarly conflicted 
when it comes to setting substantive patentability standards. Setting a 
high threshold standard of nonobviousness, for example, can limit the 
number of foreign patents granted. India offers an apparent example 
of such a "nonobviousness-plus standard.,,197 Yet, doing so is likely 
to harm local innovators who may even less capable of the 
fundamental inventive leaps contemplated under such a standard. 198 
Developing countries may therefore be drawn toward a lower 
195. Heald, supra note 23, at 284. 
196. Translation requirements apply on a country-specific basis for each member state in which 
European patent protection is being sought. In most cases, translation of the entire patent specification 
and claims are required. Samson Helfgott, Why Must Filing in Europe Be So Costly?, 76 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'y 787 (1994). 
197. See Mueller, supra note 126, at 87. 
198. /d. at 88. 
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standard that would accommodate the sort of incremental 
improvements that their local industries typically produce. 
To avoid such Hobbesian choices, developing countries should 
consider alternative protection models that can operate independently 
of the patent system to meet the needs of indigenous inventors. I99 
Such models have a long pedigree; whether labeled as "petty 
patents," "utility models," or sui generis schemes, they continue to be 
widely used today even in developed countries.200 Such regimes 
typically have relaxed inventiveness requirements, sometimes 
requiring only that an invention be "novel" (even if obvious). They 
usually operate on a registration basis, thus dispensing with the need 
to conduct ex-ante examinations. In return, the term of protection is 
typically shorter and the scope of the rights is less extensive.201 
The benefits of "second tier" patent protection have been much 
debated by commentators. Some scholars argue that utility models 
can play an important role in facilitating development.202 Others 
contend that a reduced inventiveness threshold can lead to an 
unhealthy proliferation of rights that blocks innovation by second-
comers.203 Rather than addressing the substantive merits of this 
debate, my purpose here is merely to observe how consideration of 
such alternative models can complement the institutional and 
procedural choices discussed above. 
199. See Maskus, supra note II, at 479. 
200. See generally Mark D. Janis, Second Tier Patent Protection, 40 HARV. INT'L 1. J. 151 (1999). 
Tmditionally, utility model protection was limited to three-dimensional industrial designs (as the word 
"model" suggests). However, such subject-matter restrictions have increasingly been dropped. At the 
same time, there is an opposing trend toward even more narrow subject-matter-specific sui generis 
schemes. Even the U.S., which lacks a geneml utility model scheme, has enacted severnl recent forms of 
sui generis protection. See Heald, supra note 23, at 270; Oddi, supra note IS, at 834-35. 
201. See Janis, supra note 200, at 158-176. 
202. See Maskus, supra note ll, at 479 (describing how utility models in Brazil "helped domestic 
producers gain a significant share of the farm-machinery market by encoumging adaption of foreign 
technologies to local conditions" and in Thailand led to similar "adaptive invention of rice threshers"); 
id. at 479 n.I4 (describing how postwar Japanese development relied on adaptive innovation to work 
around foreign patent claims and levemged incremental improvements protected by utility models to 
gain access to imported technologies through cross-licensing). 
203. Janis, supra note 200, at 212 (citing J.H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: 
Repackaging Rights in Sub patentable Innovation, 53 V AND. 1. REv. 1743 (2000)). To address such 
problems, some commentators have proposed limiting the remedies under such schemes to a liability 
rule mther than a property rights model (i.e., awarding royalties but not injunctions). Id. 
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Relying on a "second tier" scheme tailored to indigenous 
inventors, to some extent, enables developing countries to have it 
both ways. The regular patent system can cater primarily to 
foreigners while second tier protections for subpatentable innovations 
target local inventors.204 Just as a tiered system of fees maximizes 
income from foreigners without disadvantaging locals, similarly, 
providing this second tier of protection to local innovators reduces 
the concern over restricting access to the regular patent system. As 
we have seen, many of the "damage control" policies discussed 
above that seek to minimize or offset the costs of having a patent 
system pose significant, disproportionately burdensome obstacles to 
local innovation.205 A second tier serves as a kind of hedge against 
such collateral damage?06 Developing countries can enact deterrents 
against foreign patents-jacking up fees, tightening patentability 
standards--or employ cost saving procedures--e.g., re-registering 
foreign patents-all without causing adverse impacts on indigenous 
innovation. For developing countries that already have an emergent 
technology base, a system of utility models combined with early 
disclosure of patent applications and a narrow interpretation of claims 
can itself serve as a hedge against foreign patent power by allowing 
local firms to "invent around" foreign innovation, locking in claims 
to incremental improvements?07 Japan is often cited as an example of 
successful use of such "flooding" techniques to gain leverage in 
negotiating cross-Iicenses.208 
A further advantage of relying on second tier protection models is 
that they may not be subject to the restrictions that TRIPS imposes on 
patents.209 For example, TRIPS Article 31 restricts the issuance of 
compulsory licenses for use of "dependency" patents, whereby a 
204. This division of labor already occurs naturally in countries that subscribe to a two-tier model. For 
example, in China, the vast majority of patents today are issued to foreigners, while the registration of 
utility models is primarily of benefit to domestic innovators. 
205. See supra notes 76, 123, 178, 198 and accompanying text. 
206. Janis, supra note 200, at 196. 
207. See Maskus, supra note II, at 479 n.14. 
208. See Sri Krishna Sankaran, Patent Flooding in the United States and Japan, 40 IDEA 393 (2000). 
209. See infra note 211-13, 216 and accompanying text. 
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second patent is based on improvements on an existing patent and 
cannot be exploited without infringing the first patent. Article 31 
requires that the second patent "involve an important technical 
advance of considerable economic significance" for the license to be 
granted.2lO However, read literally, the restriction applies only to 
blocking patents.211 A compulsory license to benefit the holder of a 
utility model would, on its face, seem unencumbered by the 
restriction. To be sure, a purposivist reading of "important technical 
advance" would support reading Article 31 to cover utility models as 
well, which, as subpatentable innovation, would fall short of that 
standard almost by definition. It is possible a WTO panel could be 
persuaded to extend Article 31' s restriction to second tier rights-
holders on that basis. However, this approach would go against the 
plain language of the treaty and would thus have to overcome the 
WTO's strong bias toward textualist over purposivist 
interpretation.212 
Similarly, subject-matter discrimination with respect to patents is 
forbidden under TRIPS Article 27; yet, this restriction does not apply 
to sui generis schemes. Developing countries are free to tailor their 
second tier schemes around particular industries where local 
innovators have a comparative advantage. Recourse to local expertise 
in the chosen technologies can alleviate some of the burdens of 
210. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 31 (k). 
211. There is some ambiguity in the usage of "patent" in TRIPS Article 27 that could support to an 
expansive meaning. See NOLFF, supra note 25, at 52 (reference to plant patents in Article 27(30(b) 
suggests that "patents" could mean more than "utility patents"). The PCT defines patents to have this 
broader meaning, and conceivably TRIPS could be read to be consistent. On the other hand, the Paris 
Convention does make a textual distinction between "patents" and ''utility models." Given that TRIPS 
explicitly incorporates the Paris Convention, arguably its definitions should control. See Vienna 
Convention, supra note 150, art. 30; UNCT AD RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 82, at 48. 
212. International treaties are generally subject to a rule of strict construction: without explicit 
indication to the contrary, a country should not be presumed to have encumbered its sovereign rights. To 
be on the safe side, however, developing countries may want to fashion sui generis protection schemes 
that fall outside any recognized patent model or, at least, are not labeled as such. Cf STEPHEN.M. 
STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS 39-43 (2d ed. 1989) (suggesting 
that national treatment obligation under Berne Convention turns on formal designation as "copyright" 
provision under national law). 
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administering such schemes.213 Countries can also focus on sectors 
where development of technology will reap the most immediate 
benefits, e.g., agriculture?14 Such targeted protection reduces the 
concern that subpatentable rights will give rise an anticompetitive 
utility model "thicket" or "anti-commons" problem by restricting 
subpatentable rights to domains where the benefits outweigh costS.2lS 
In addition, subject-matter tailoring minimizes the risk that foreign 
inventors, too, might exploit the second tier as an end run around 
roadblocks in the regular patent system. 
An even more direct way of keeping foreigners from entering the 
second tier would be to condition access on reciprocity. Arguably, 
TRIPS' national treatment rules apply only to the specific intellectual 
property rights specified in the treaty, leaving countries free to 
discriminate with respect to sui generis IP regimes.216 Overtly 
preferential treatment might violate the Paris Convention's broader 
national treatment principle?17 However, some sui generis schemes, 
such as those directed at protecting traditional knowledge of 
indigenous communities, could be structured to discriminate de facto 
without much cause for objection?18 Moreover, both the United 
213. See id. (describing how sui generis plant protection registries are often housed within a ministry 
of agriculture or the agricultural division of a public university). 
214. See Sherwood, supra note I, at 491. 
215. See Reichman, supra note 203, at 1776; Janis, supra note 200, at 188. See generally Michael A. 
Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical 
Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998). 
216. TRIPS Article 3 requires national treatment with regard to "intellectual property," a term defined 
in Article I as restricted to the "categories of intellectual property" covered in TRIPS itself. 
217. Article 2 of the Paris Convention sets out a national treatment rule that covers utility models, as 
well other forms of industrial property ''understood in the broadest sense." However, the Paris 
Convention lacks any enforcement mechanism except in so far it has been incorporated into TRIPS, and 
TRIPS' national treatment provision (Article 2) incorporates Paris Convention Article 2 only "in respect 
of' the subject-matter contained in TRIPS itself, presenting a difficult interpretive question as to the 
scope of this obligation. See Panel Report, United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 
1998, WTIDS 176/ ABIR (Jan. 2, 2002) (addressing TRIPS' incorporation of Paris Convention Article 8); 
UNCT AD RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 82, at 48-54. 
218. Because indigenous knowledge is, almost by definition, unique to a particular place, the benefits 
of such schemes can be limited to nationals without explicitly saying so. The substantial precedent 
established by existing (in many cases long-established) sui generis regimes to protect indigenous 
knowledge found in both developed and developing countries serves to insulate such schemes from legal 
challenge, which, as a practical matter, would be politically indelicate. Moreover, some have even 
argued that such schemes are required under the Rio Convention on Biodiversity and thus impliedly 
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States and the European Community have established precedents for 
enforcing reciprocity requirements with respect to sui generis IP 
regimes, however contrary to the spirit of national treatment such 
restrictions may be.219 Developing countries should feel no 
compunction about doing the same. 
CONCLUSION 
Implementing TRIPS' patent mandate presents developing 
countries with a complex array of policy decisions to be made. How 
they ultimately choose from the menu of options before them will 
depend on the underlying calculus of costs and benefits that such 
countries associate with patent protection. However, by making 
creative use of the flexibilities that TRIPS allows and by thinking 
strategically across all facets of patent system design (including 
alternative protection models), developing countries can potentially 
turn patent protection to their advantage. Rather than bemoaning 
TRIPS' mandate as a burden imposed upon them for the benefit of 
outsiders, such countries should look to capture the pro-development 
potential of patents, while minimizing the harmful side effects. 
For many developing countries, operating a patent system remains 
a novelty, and further experimentation is doubtless needed before 
definitive conclusions can be reached as to the pros and cons of 
particular strategies. Interestingly, this process of experimentation 
comes at a time at which rich countries themselves are rethinking 
many aspects of their established patent systems.220 While these two 
trends are not necessarily moving in parallel,221 they do offer the 
sanctioned under TRIPS. See, e.g., Muria Kruger, Note, Harmonizing TRIPs and the CBD: A Proposal 
from India, JOMINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 169,188-191 (2001). 
219. See Oddi, supra note 15, at 874. 
220. See, e.g., Asami, supra note 74; Linck et aI., supra note 128; Lemley, supra note 69; Sheri 
Qualters, Patent Changes Stir Ire, NAT'L L. J., Nov. 13,2006, at I. 
221. Patent reform proposals in the developed world focus primarily on coping with an ever rising 
flood on patent applications, as well as adapting the challenges of new technologies and preparing for 
substantive harmonization of international standards. See Asami, supra note 74. Developing countries 
are likely to have a very different agenda. See generally Sanders, supra note 29, at 899-902 (discussing 
"Development Agenda" at WIPO and related WTO initiatives). 
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potential for overlapping insights and innovations from which all 
sides can learn. 
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APPENDIX 
PATENT FEES IMPOSED BY SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Country Acquisition Fees Maintenance Fees 
Full Discount Discount Backloaded? 
Price Rate Full Price Rate 
! 
$600 Yes f-Barbados $20,900 1 ___ 
------
Belarus $100 $7,250 
Belize $433.50 I $9,690 
Brazil $340 ~ $107.50- I $770-$1!.?p.50 L_. __ 
-------_.-
$7,216 I Croatia --;3-22.76 -I -$101.68-- $1804--
! ! Estonia $305.68 $76.42--- $7,327.51 I 
I 
.-!lung!!!! $665 $166-- $12,481 I $6243--
India $348 $87··· $4,788 I $1197-·· 
I I Latvia $264 I $2,607 
i $21.32§ i $373§ Morocco $85.26 I $1,495 I 
$183 I I Nepal $191 I 
1 I 
Pakistan $37.09 L-. ~1,368 I I 
----
, 
$60.33 I I PhilipP.i,nes 30.16! $6,828 1 $3414! ! 
I i 
Poland $242 i $4,817 
i _J5'14.L~ Slovakia ._ ... ~~02·~.LL .,..g1L27••• 
_._---- --- ---
I 
Tunisia $129.22 . $2,584 I 
I 
Uzbekistan $670 $5,020 
Jordan $210.38 $210 
Indonesia $60.95 $2,857 
Slovenia $154 $7,285 
t Reflects total lifetime cost of maintaining patent over complete term (20 years). 
- Fee charged to physical persons, institutions oflearning, and small businesses . 
.. Fee charged where applicant is the actual inventor (and not a corporation) . 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
... Fee charged where applicant is a natural person (i.e. private individual vs. corporation). 
Total Lifetime Costs 
Discount 
Full Price Rate 
I 
$21,500 
------_._-
_M _____ .... ____ 
$7,350 
$10,123.50 I 
__ ..E,2~~_ $878-r------' --
$7,539 $1905--
$7,633 $7709:~~ 
$1~,66~ __ ~.J>~09~~ 
$5,136 i $1284"-
$2,872 I 
.. --+-_ .... _-- - .. -
$1,580 I $395§ 
I 
$375 1 
t 
$1,405 I 
--.. __ .... -.. -.. t .. -.. -..... --._.-
$6,888.33 $3444.16! 
$5,060 
$5,350 
-----_ .. _ .. '- ...... ~~..!§.?:.E~~~ 
$2,713 I 
$5,690 L ______ 
$420 I 
$2,917 
$7,440 I 
§ Applicable to nationals of states whose average national income per capita is less than US $3000. 
t Fee charged for a "small entity" (one whose assets do not exceed the equivalent of US $431,000) or any government agency 
including public corporations, universities, and schools. 
